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Abstract 
 
The 2016 NDAA authorized changes to the military retirement system 
transitioning from the legacy High-3 defined benefit annuity to the new Blended 
Retirement System (BRS).  In exchange for a reduced defined benefit annuity, the BRS 
incorporates automatic and matching contributions to the member’s Thrift Savings Plan 
and a continuation payment offered at 12 years of service.  In 2018, service members 
with less than 12 years of service will make an irrevocable decision between the two 
retirement systems.  This research effort addresses the problem by developing a decision 
analysis model incorporating up to 27 different input variables. Service members can use 
the associated Microsoft Excel spreadsheet tool to calculate the expected net present 
value of each retirement alternative based on their own personal circumstances.  We 
analyze 26 typical career demographic groups to understand how the recommended 
alternative is impacted by various factors including personal discount rate, expected 
continuation pay multiplier, and probability of reaching 20 years of service.  Each 
member must make difficult assessments of these variables in order to determine their 
preferred alternative.  We conduct two-variable sensitivity analysis and present the results 
in third-variable break-even policy charts, providing members with clarity of thought and 
action as they approach the 2018 opt-in window. 
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2018 MILITARY RETIREMENT OPTIONS: 
 
AN EXPECTED NET PRESENT VALUE DECISION ANALYSIS MODEL 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
Background 
The 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the Military 
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission (MCRMC).  The goal of the 
MCRMC was to determine whether changes were necessary to military compensation 
and/or retirement benefits (United States Congress, 2012).  In January 2015, the 
MCRMC published their report.  The report recommended that Congress make several 
changes, particularly to the retirement system (MCRMC, 2015).  The 2016 NDAA 
authorized changes to the military retirement system moving from the fixed-benefit cliff-
vested annuity to a new retirement system that blends the current fixed-benefit plan with 
contributions to the 401(k) style Thrift Savings Plan and a continuation payment offered 
at 12 years of service.  Starting 1 January, 2018 and continuing through 31 December, 
2018, service members with less than 12 years of time-in-service will be able to opt-in to 
the new Blended Retirement System (BRS).  Alternatively, they can decide to remain in 
the current High-3 Retirement System (United States Congress, 2015).   
Problem 
Service members need to be prepared to make a decision between the current 
DOD retirement system and the BRS.  This should be an informed decision based on the 
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service member’s particular life circumstances and personal preferences.  This research 
effort addresses the problem by developing an expected net present value decision 
analysis model incorporating up to 27 different input variables and then conducting 
analysis on the generated results. Using this framework, service members can gain 
personalized insight to make an informed decision. 
The decision between the two retirement systems presents a dilemma for many 
service members and those supervisors, commanders, and base support personnel who 
would advise them.  How do we guide these service members to a decision that is 
appropriate for their circumstances?  There are many things to consider – the member’s 
motivations for service, family considerations, the member’s financial situation now and 
in the future, etc.  Those circumstances are unique to every individual.  This thesis 
focuses on the problem strictly from a financial point of view.  The member can then 
weigh any unique family circumstances against the recommendation provided by this 
model and the accompanying analysis. 
Once members document their election, the choice will be irrevocable.  
Meanwhile, the benefits received under each system could potentially be vastly different.  
This is a highly personal decision since each service member has different service 
history, expectations of career progression, time value of money, etc.  As such, it is not 
prudent to provide service members with broad guidance based solely on current grade 
and service length.  
3 
Research Questions 
Our research will attempt to answer the following questions: 
1. Given a service member’s particular circumstances, how do we quantity the value of 
each retirement system in a way that most service members can follow? 
It is important that we make a valid, yet understandable comparison between the 
two alternatives.  A model that is too simplistic may provide inconsistent or 
inaccurate recommendations, while a model that is too complex and accounts for 
too many factors may add unnecessary confusion and lead to incorrect use. 
2. Under what general conditions are each of the alternatives preferred?   
We would like to identify any general guidance that can be given to these service 
members. 
3. How does the decision differ among  typical demographic groups?  
Whereas the second question focused on how the decision is similar for all 
member, this question focuses on how it changes for specific demographic 
groups. 
4. At what point does the recommended alternative change as a member’s 
circumstances change? 
As we will see, there are a few variables which are difficult to put a value 
on.  We would like our analysis to be flexible so that it shows members 
how their recommended alternative changes over the feasible range of 
these variables.  
4 
Definitions 
It is important to ensure clarity on the many specialized terms that are used in this 
research.  As a starting point, the following definitions are offered.  Further definitions 
are provided as needed throughout this research. 
1. Personal Discount Rate (PDR) - the interest rate used in discounted cash flow (DCF) 
analysis to determine the present value of future cash flows.  
2. Continuation pay – a lump sum payment to service members in the Blended 
Retirement System at 12 years of service, equal to 2.5 to 13 months of basic pay 
(United States Congress, 2015).  
3. Defined benefit annuity - an employer-sponsored retirement plan where employee 
benefits are determined based on a formula using factors such as salary history and 
duration of employment.   The employer assumes the risks of any investments made 
in order to meet the annuity obligations. 
4. Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) – A 401(k) style investment vehicle available to service 
members and other federal employees. 
5. TSP matching contributions – monthly contributions to TSP accounts made by the 
federal government to match personal contributions in some ratio and up to some 
maximum percentage.  Matching contributions are not offered by the current 
retirement system but will be offered in the Blended Retirement System starting in 
the member’s third year of service. 
6. TSP automatic contribution – a monthly contribution made by the federal government 
to the TSP account of those enrolled in the Blended Retirement System, equal to 1% 
5 
of basic pay and starting at 60 days of service.  The service member does not have to 
make any contributions to TSP in order to receive the automatic contribution (United 
States Congress, 2015). 
7. Expected Value - the weighted average of all possible outcomes under certain 
circumstances, with the weights being assigned by the probability that each particular 
outcome will occur. 
8. Net Present Value (NPV) - the sum of the present value of cash inflows (positive) and 
the present value of cash outflows (negative).  All future cash flows are multiplied by 
the personal discount rate raised to the number of years to determine the present value 
of each cash flow.  The present values are then summed to determine NPV. 
Preview 
A historical context and thorough review of both retirement systems is presented 
in Chapter 2 and the methodology used to conduct the research is detailed in Chapter 3.   
To accomplish the goal of providing service members with personalized insight on this 
important decision, we develop an expected net present value model and build a 
representation of the model using Microsoft Excel 2016, Visual Basics for Applications 
(VBA), and Excel’s Data Analysis Toolkit.  The Excel tool will provide the service 
member with visual aids to illustrate how the interaction between variables affects the 
decision between the two retirement systems.   
The expected NPVs under both retirement systems are calculated and compared 
in order to determine the preferred alternative.  Once we have developed the 
methodology, the individual-based component of our study is nearly complete.  The 
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graphical output of the decision support tool will be different for all individuals, and a 
recommendation will be provided along with sensitivity and break-even analysis.   
In Chapter 4, we make estimates and assumptions on several variables and then 
run the analysis tool for 26 typical demographic groups facing this decision.  This serves 
two purposes.  First, it allows us to demonstrate the sensitivity and break-even analysis 
charts that each member will receive.  Second, it allows us to investigate how the 
decision is both similar and different across these demographic groups.  Instances of the 
model are classified by the resulting recommendation, and policy charts are presented 
and discussed.  Based on this analysis, our conclusions are presented in Chapter 5.  The 
original model is updated along with the decision support tool, and the final versions are 
included as an attachment to this study. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
Several assumptions must be made in order to give this problem a feasible scope.  
First, although the goal is to create a robust tool that accurately incorporates as many 
variables as possible, no tool can account for every possible situation.  The scope of this 
research will include those variables which are common in retirement planning tools (e.g. 
discount rate, inflation rate, return on investment, etc.) as well as additional variables 
which are specifically relevant for most service members making this decision (e.g. time 
in grade, time in service, expected grade at retirement, continuation pay, TSP 
contribution rate, yearly cost of living adjustments to retired pay, etc.).  
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Second, there is no way to precisely determine future values of several variables.  
In these cases, historical data may be analyzed to determine the expected value.  
Examples of these variables include the inflation rate, investment returns, cost of living 
increase, etc.  Our methods for estimating these values are covered in Chapters 3 and 4.   
For other variables, although an expected value can be calculated, it is more prudent to 
present the service member with the historical distribution and allow the service member 
to estimate the value based on knowledge of their specific situation.  Examples here 
include the year of promotion to each new grade and length of service.  For input 
variables that are difficult to determine precisely, the tool should be able to provide 
insight on how the preferred alternative changes based on the value of those variables.  In 
other words, it will provide a sensitivity analysis on these variables. 
Finally, the fundamental assumption that must be accepted for any decision 
analysis research is that the analysis can only determine the “best” decision at the time 
that the analysis is performed.  In hindsight, it may be discovered that the best decision, 
as determined by the analysis, may not have resulted in the best possible outcome.  Yet, it 
was still the best decision given the state of information at the time the decision was 
made.  For example, a service member may estimate a 95% probability that his/her 
service length will be greater than 20 years.  Based on this probability, the model may 
recommend that the service member choose to stay with the current retirement system.  
However, there is still a 5% probability that service length will be less than 20 years.  If 
that happens, there may be a mismatch between the best decision as determined at 
decision time and the best outcome in retirement.  In this way, uncertainty and natural 
8 
variability account for the possible difference between the best decision and the best 
outcome. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
Service members need to be prepared to make an educated decision between the 
current DOD retirement system and the new Blended Retirement System.  This research 
effort addresses the problem by developing a decision analysis tool through which service 
members can gain personalized insight into the decision at hand.  This chapter will 
review the history of the military retirement system, focusing primarily on the 
chronological changes to the formula used to calculate retired pay for military members.  
The details of the current High-3 system and the BRS are also presented, along with the 
analysis work already accomplished in regards to the BRS. 
Historical Context 
The American non-disability military retirement system is nearly as old as the 
country itself.  Disability pensions were provided by the pilgrims, and even these 
provisions are pre-dated by English pension law.  However, non-disability pensions were 
first provided by Congress in 1780 to officers who served until the end of the 
Revolutionary War.  These provisions were initially controversial and many claims were 
settled for much less than their full value.  In the first half of the 1800s, Congress 
revisited the issue and extended full pay for life to these veterans and their widows (DoD 
Office of the Actuary, 2014).   
In 1861, just months after the start of the Civil War, Congress passed an act 
providing for the voluntary retirement of military officers with 40 or more years of 
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service at the discretion of the President.  This act was followed by others which allowed 
for involuntary non-disability retirements.   
The retired pay of Army and Marine Corps officers was computed as “pay 
proper” plus four rations.  Pay proper was a set amount for each officer grade, while 
rations had a value of $9 per month.  Therefore, retired pay depended solely on the retired 
grade.  Service length was not directly rewarded in retirement. As an example, pay proper 
for a colonel was $95 per month and a colonel with 40 years of service was receiving 14 
rations prior to retirement—6 for grade and 8 for longevity.  Therefore, the colonel’s final 
pay prior to retirement was $221 per month.  In retirement, he received the $95 pay 
proper along with four rations, which equated to $131 per month or roughly 60% of final 
pay. An additional 5 years of duty without a promotion would earn the colonel one more 
ration during his service, but would not increase his retired pay.  In fact, as a percentage 
of his final pay, the colonel’s retired pay would decrease (Department of Defense, 2011). 
In the early 1870s, active-duty officer pay was overhauled.  This naturally 
required changes to retirement pay as well.  The non-disability retirement service 
requirement was changed to 30 years for Army and Marine Corps officers, with 
retirement pay being set at 75% of base and longevity pay.  Navy officers’ retired pay 
was also set at 75% of sea duty pay, but they were not permitted voluntary retirement at 
30 years of service until 1908.  Army and Marine Corps enlisted members first received 
non-disability retired pay beginning in 1885 under the same requirement of 30 years and 
a rate of 75% of final pay with an additional allowance for “quarters, fuel, and light”.  
Navy enlisted members obtained this benefit in 1899 (Department of Defense, 2011). 
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In 1916, the retired-pay formula for Naval officers was changed to 2.5% of final 
basic pay for each year of service, not to exceed 75%.  Partial years were rounded to the 
nearest whole year.   The Navy’s minimum service length for enlisted retirement was also 
changed to 16 years for a one-third multiplier and 20 years for a one-half multiplier.  The 
16-year option was later eliminated in 1925 (Department of Defense, 2011).   
The 1920s saw a couple temporary changes to the retired pay formula for Army 
officers to support ongoing force management efforts.  In 1935 the Army adopted the 
Navy officer formula of 2.5% for each year of service up to a maximum of 75% but with 
a minimum service requirement of only 15 years.  The Navy also modified its officer 
promotion and minimum service length requirements during this time period but never 
strayed from the 2.5% multiplier and 75% cap for officers.  In 1938, the Navy settled on a 
minimum service length of 20 commissioned years for voluntary officer retirement.  By 
1948, enlisted and officer retired-pay for all services was calculated using the same 
standard formula: 2.5% multiplier, 75% maximum, and a minimum of 20 years of active 
service with at least 10 years of commissioned service for officers.  Additionally, enlisted 
members could receive a 10% increase in their retired pay for “extraordinary heroism” 
during their service (Department of Defense, 2011). 
Prior to 1981, retired pay was based on the member’s final basic pay.  In the wake 
of growing concern about expanding retirement liabilities, the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act of 1981 changed the law to compute retired pay based on the average 
of a retiree’s highest three years of basic pay.  This formula came to be known as “High-
3”.  Of note, those who were members of the armed services prior to enactment of this 
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law were “grandfathered,” and their retired pay continued to be calculated based on their 
final pay.  The Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1984 provided that monthly 
retired pay would be rounded down to the nearest dollar in order to extract a bit more 
savings from the retirement system.  This act also ended the practice of rounding service 
length up or down to the nearest year when determining the retired pay multiplier.  Going 
forward, service length was required to be rounded down to the nearest whole month 
(Department of Defense, 2011). 
The next major change came with the Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986.  
This law reduced the retired pay multiplier by 1% for each year of service short of 30 
years.  In essence, this equated to a 2.0% multiplier for the first 20 years of service and a 
3.5% multiplier for each year of service beyond 20 years, topping out at 30 years and 
75%.  Members serving 30 years or more saw no change to their multiplier.  Those who 
did suffer the reduction were provided relief at age 62, when their multiplier reverted to 
2.5% times their years of service.  Also, the computation of the yearly cost of living 
adjustment (COLA) was changed from the benchmark Consumer Price Index (CPI) to 
CPI minus 1%, with a one-time correction to retired pay as calculated using CPI at age 
62.  These provisions are collectively known as the “Redux” system. Once again, the 
provisions were only applied to service members joining after the effective date of the 
law, 1 August, 1986 (Department of Defense, 2011).   
The reduced incentives of the Redux system led to concerns over the military’s 
ability to recruit and retain quality personnel.  The National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2000 gave all members under the Redux system the option to elect a 
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retirement under the pre-1986 High-3 system, with no reduction in their retired pay 
multiplier or COLA calculation.  Alternatively, these members could elect to receive a 
$30,000 Career Status Bonus (CSB) with an agreement to remain on the Redux 
retirement system and serve at least 20 years.  This election was made at the 15-year 
service mark (Department of Defense, 2011).  
Of the three retirement systems currently in effect, High-3 is the only system 
which applies to military members with the option to enroll into the BRS.  The act that 
created the BRS also contained a sunset provision for the Redux system, thereby 
eliminating that option for service members attaining 15 years of service after 31 
December, 2017 (United States Congress, 2015). On the other hand, the Final Pay system 
only applies to those members who joined prior to 8 September, 1980, none of whom 
would have less than 12 years of service today (Department of Defense, 2011).  
Therefore, our audience only has the options of the High-3 system or the Blended 
Retirement System. 
High-3 Retirement System 
The High-3 Retirement System currently in effect is a defined-benefit, cliff-vested 
annuity.   A defined-benefit is one in which the beneficiary does not assume any market 
risk.  In other words, the benefit is set by some formula and, given a set of retirement 
conditions, the benefit to the retiree can be calculated in advance.  Cliff-vesting refers to 
the practice of vesting a beneficiary in full at a specific point in time, rather than allowing 
for incremental vesting at multiple points over time.  In the case of the High-3 non-
disability retirement system, military retirees become fully vested at 20 years of service 
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(YOS). The defined benefit can be calculated by multiplying the average of the highest 
three years of active-duty pay by a multiplier.  The multiplier is equal to 2.5% times the 
years of service.  YOS is the total length of service rounded down to the next full month 
or one-twelfth of a year.  For example, a total service length of 23 years plus an 
additional 96 days would be rounded to 23 years and 3 months, or 23.25 years of service.   
Blended Retirement System 
The new Blended Retirement System offers an automatic contribution to the 
member’s TSP account equal to 1% of monthly basic pay.  Additionally, the DOD will 
match the member’s contributions one-for-one up to 3% of monthly basic pay, with an 
additional half percent match for the member’s 4th and 5th percent of basic pay.  
Therefore, the maximum DOD contribution is 5% of monthly basic pay.  The automatic 
and matching contributions are available to the service member until reaching retirement 
or 26 years of service, whichever occurs first. 
Additionally, the Blended Retirement System offers a continuation payment at 12 
years of service in exchange for the member’s commitment to serve a minimum of 4 
additional years.  This continuation payment is equal to the product of the member’s 
monthly basic pay at 12 years and a continuation pay multiplier.  Current law sets a 
minimum continuation pay multiplier of 2.5 and a maximum of 13. 
Finally, the new Blended Retirement System preserves the defined benefit annuity 
feature of the High-3 Retirement System.  However, the formula used to calculate the 
15 
retirement pay multiplier is changed from 2.5% times the years of service to 2.0% times 
the years of service.  This is notionally a 20% reduction of the defined benefit annuity. 
Relevant Research 
The main source of research in regard to the new retirement system is the Military 
Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission’s 2015 report to Congress.  
The goal of the MCRMC was to determine whether changes were necessary to military 
compensation and/or retirement benefits.  The commission contracted RAND 
Corporation to conduct analysis in support of their review (MCRMC, 2015:206). 
RAND based its analysis on the RAND Dynamic Retention Model, a proprietary 
dynamic programming model of individual choice regarding active-component retention 
that was estimated based on longitudinal data and with capability to simulate alternative 
compensation policies. An important criterion of that analysis was whether a reform 
could sustain the current force size and shape. RAND found that the proposed BRS could 
do so.  In fact, it could do so while also achieving cost savings ranging from 2.3 billion to 
7.7 billion (Asch, Mattock, & Hosek, 2015:43). 
Based on RAND’s analysis, the commission’s report recommended that Congress 
transition the military retirement system to the blended system which we will see 
implemented in 2018 (MCRMC, 2015:37–38). 
Not many retirement planning tools are currently available to help service 
members make this important decision.  The tools that are available remain very basic in 
nature and do not provide any sort of sensitivity analysis on variables that are difficult to 
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determine precisely.  These informal tools may be acceptable for advising those service 
members who are at the extremes of the recommendation spectrum (i.e. definitely switch 
to the new system or definitely stay with the old system), but even then, there has been no 
effort to define the line where these sorts of generalities can be considered good 
guidance.  The DOD has plans for a comparison calculator, but has not yet released it as 
of this writing (Department of Defense, 2016:3).   
The only thing we can state for sure at this point is that the BRS will always be as 
good as or better than High-3 for any service member who is 100% sure they will 
separate before becoming retirement eligible.  These members will receive no retirement 
benefits under High-3 but have the opportunity to at least receive automatic DOD TSP 
contributions under the BRS.   
Until more rigorous analysis is conducted, everyone else is in the “gray” area.  
Our study seeks to define that area more precisely for each service member and provide 
them with tools to assist in making the best decision in the face of uncertainty. 
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III.  Methodology 
Chapter Overview 
To accomplish the goal of providing service members with personalized insight 
on this important decision, we develop a model to calculate the expected Net Present 
Value (NPV) of the two alternatives given several inputs from the member.  We start 
with the necessary expected value formula, then proceed to break down the NPV 
computation of each alternative into smaller elements.  This methodology provides a 
framework for determining the preferred alternative given an individual’s personal 
inputs.  In Chapter 4, we make several estimates and assumptions and then execute the 
model for 26 different demographic groups.  This allows us to demonstrate the analysis 
provided and investigate our research questions. 
Expected Net Present Value 
As an expected value, we multiply each possible outcome by the probability of 
obtaining that outcome.  We expect the member’s length of service to have the most 
significant impact on the comparative values of the two systems.  The net present value 
of both retirement systems will experience a significant jump when the member passes 20 
years of service and earns a retirement pension.  Prior to that point, the legacy High-3 
system will have a value of zero since the pension is the sole element of this retirement 
system.  Of note, the member’s own TSP contributions are not considered in this 
analysis.  We make the assumption that member TSP contribution are the same under 
each system, therefore only DOD contributions are included, and only for the BRS. The 
BRS will slowly build value through those DOD TSP contributions prior to 20 years of 
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service.  The BRS will also see a significant increase at 20 years of service, but the jump 
will be smaller than that under High-3 due to the decreased pension multiplier.  Because 
of the large change in value that occurs at 20 years of service, our model utilizes 
conditional expected values based upon whether or not the member reaches this 
milestone.  This simplifies the process of eliciting the distribution of YOS from the 
member while accounting for the large difference in value on either side of the 20-year 
mark.  Using this approach, we require three values from the member: 
1) P(YOS≥20) - probability of attaining 20 or more years of service, designated p 
2) E[YOS|YOS≥20] - expected YOS given a pension is earned, designated x 
3) E[YOS|YOS<20] - expected YOS given a pension is not earned, designated y 
We then compute the net present value of the alternative at the two point 
estimates, multiply each by the member’s probability of meeting the associated 
conditions, and sum these values to determine the unconditional expected net present 
value of the retirement system.  
 𝐸[𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑅𝑆] = 𝑝 ∗ (𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑅𝑆|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑅𝑆|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑦) (1) 
 𝐸[𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3] = 𝑝 ∗ (𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑥) + (1 − 𝑝)(𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑦) (2) 
Where: 
YOS = total years of service at separation or retirement 
p = probability of attaining 20 or more years of service 
NPVBRS = net present value of the Blended Retirement System 
NPVHigh−3 = net present value of the High − 3 Retirement System 
x = expected years of service given that a pension is earned 
y = expected years of service given that a pension is not earned 
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The rest of this chapter discusses our methodology for determining the net present 
value of each retirement system given the elicited value of x or y. 
Net Present Value 
To find the NPVs needed for Equations 1 and 2 above, we first note the 
components of each system.  The High-3 system only has one component, a defined 
benefit annuity.  The BRS has three components: a defined benefit annuity, a 
continuation payment, and DOD TSP contributions.  An annuity is a stream of future 
income.  The NPV of a stream of cashflows is equal to the sum of the discounted future 
payments in the stream.  On the other hand, the continuation payment is a single payment 
made at 12 years of service under the BRS.  Therefore, no further summing is required.  
Finally, the DOD TSP contributions would at first seem to be a stream of future income.  
However, these DOD TSP contributions are not readily accessible to the member until 
they reach age 59.5 due to IRS penalties for early withdrawal.  The DOD TSP 
contributions continue to grow within the member’s TSP account while the member is 
still in his/her working years.  The rate of growth is discussed later in this chapter.  
However, members do not actually “receive” these TSP funds until they start taking TSP 
distributions.  Therefore, we model the DOD TSP benefit as an accumulated value at age 
59.5.  If the member is still on active duty at age 59.5, we continue this accumulation 
until the member’s military retirement date.   
The individual components discussed above are summed to obtain the net present 
value of each retirement system. 
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 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑅𝑆 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑅𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦 + 𝑃𝑉𝐷𝑂𝐷 𝑇𝑆𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (3) 
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3 = 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (4) 
The net present value formula converts any cash flow into an equivalent amount 
received today, thereby accounting for the time value of money.  Our model also allows 
the member to choose any base date in the future.  The date chosen will not impact the 
recommended alternative; this flexibility is only provided so that the member can 
determine values at a future date if desired.  For example, the member may wish to use 
the expected date of their military retirement or the expected date of their retirement from 
the workforce.  The net present value also depends upon the member’s discount rate, or 
the rate at which future cashflows are discounted.  Our model allows the member to 
designate any personal discount rate based upon his/her own preferences for present 
versus future income and alternative investments.  The personal discount rate is normally 
given in annual terms.  Our model converts the annual rate into a monthly rate using 
Equation 5 below.  For NPV calculations, all discount rates must be in terms of the 
compounding period.  By converting all rates to an equivalent monthly rate, we simplify 
the computation of discounted monthly payments which are found throughout our model.   
 𝑑𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦  =  (1 + 𝑑𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙)
1/12 − 1 (5) 
Where: 
dmonthly = monthly rate 
dannual = annual rate 
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From this point forward, the personal discount rate will be a monthly rate 
designated simply as d. 
The net present value of our defined benefit annuity is computed as follows: 
 
𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =  ∑ 𝑅𝑃𝑡 (1 + 𝑑)
−𝑡
𝐸
𝑡=0
 (6) 
Where: 
RPt = the nominal retired annuity payment at time t 
t = number of months elapsed since the base date 
d = the personal discount rate per month 
E = total number of months between the base date and the member’s death 
Basic Pay 
The next portion of this chapter describes how we determined the nominal values 
for the annuity payments, continuation pay, and TSP contributions.  First, however, we 
must discuss the computation of basic monthly pay, which is integral to all elements of 
these retirement systems.  Annuity payments are a function of the highest three years of 
basic pay.  Continuation pay is some multiple of basic pay at 12 years of service.  Finally, 
DOD TSP contributions are a percentage of basic pay each month.  Therefore, a 
prerequisite to calculating any of these values is to project the monthly basic pay 
throughout the member’s career.   
Monthly basic pay is determined by a member’s grade and years of service.  Our 
model permits the member to designate his/her own rank progression.  For example, the 
member may expect to progress faster than his/her peers and therefore set expected 
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promotion dates to earlier values.  The member may also designate the decision effective 
date, or the date in 2018 when the decision is made.  Starting with the member’s current 
rank and current years of service on the decision effective date, the model projects basic 
pay throughout the member’s career.  The projection ends upon reaching the expected 
years of service given that a retirement is earned, previously designated x.  In each 
month, the model determines the member’s years of service and rank based upon the 
Total Active Federal Military Service Date (TAFMSD) and rank progression provided by 
the member.   The model then uses these values to obtain the basic pay from the 2017 
basic pay table.  This pay is increased by the member’s specified wage growth rate (g) 
over the number of years elapsed since 2017.  The monthly basic pay at time j, given 
grade and years of service at time j, is found using the following equation: 
 𝐵𝑃𝑗(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗, 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑗) = 𝐵𝑃2017(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗, 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑗) ∗  (1 + 𝑔)
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑗−2017 (7) 
Where  
BPj(Gradej, YOSj) = basic pay at time j given grade and YOS at time j 
yearj = the calendar year associated with time j 
g = wage growth rate 
Annuity Payments 
Under both retirement systems, the defined benefit annuity payments are based 
upon the average of the final 3 years (36 months) of basic pay, given that the member 
completes 20 years of service.  If the member separates before 20 years of service, no 
annuity is paid and NPVannuity = 0.  Assuming YOS ≥ 20, the DOD Financial 
Management Regulation (FMR) states that the retirement base pay is determined using 
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the pay table in effect at the time of retirement (DoD, 2016:Table1-5).  Therefore, the 
computation does not use nominal pay received.  Our model uses the following equation 
to determine retirement base pay (RBPk) given the months of service at retirement, k. 
 
𝑅𝐵𝑃𝑘 =
∑ 𝐵𝑃2017(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗, 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑗) ∗  (1 + 𝑔)
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑘−2017𝑘
𝑗=𝑘−36
36
 (8) 
Where  
RBPk = retired base pay given k months of service at retirement 
BPj(Gradej, YOSj) = basic pay at time j given grade and YOS at time j 
yeark = the calendar year associated with time k 
g = wage growth rate 
Next, we compute the annuity multiplier, Mannuity.  Under the High-3 system, the 
annuity multiplier is equal to the product of 2.5% and the YOS at retirement.  The BRS 
uses the same formula with a reduced 2.0% annuity factor. 
 𝑀𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  =  𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑘  ∗  2.5% (9) 
 𝑀𝐵𝑅𝑆 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  =  𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑘  ∗  2.0% (10) 
Where  
MHigh−3 annuity = High − 3 annuity multiplier 
MBRS annuity = BRS annuity multiplier 
YOSk = years of service at the time of retirement, k 
Finally, we simply multiply the RBP by the annuity multiplier to obtain the initial 
monthly retirement pay (RP0) for the service member. 
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 𝑅𝑃0  =  𝑅𝐵𝑃𝑘  ∗  𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 (11) 
Where  
RP0 = initial monthly retired pay 
RBPk = retired base pay given k months of service at retirement 
Mannuity = applicable annuity multiplier 
The initial monthly retirement pay applies during the first calendar year of 
retirement.  Each December, the DOD applies a cost of living adjustment (COLA) based 
on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) growth over the previous year.  This adjustment 
accounts for inflation in order to maintain the purchasing power of the annuity during 
retirement.  Our model allows the member to specify their own annual inflation rate, i.  
The new monthly annuity payments begin in January.  At the end of the first calendar 
year, a partial cost of living adjustment (COLA0) is applied based upon the CPI growth 
experienced since the calendar quarter of the member’s retirement date (q).  We estimate 
the partial and full COLA factors as follows: 
 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴0  = (1 + 𝑖)
1−𝑞/4 (12) 
 𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙  =  1 + 𝑖 (13) 
Where  
COLA0 = partial cost of living adjustment in first year of retirement 
q = calendar quarter of retirement 
COLAfull = cost of living adjustment applied annually after first year 
i = inflation rate 
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The monthly retired pay for each subsequent year (v) can be found by multiplying 
the previous year’s retired pay by the applicable COLA factor. 
 𝑅𝑃1  =  𝑅𝑃0  ∗  𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴0 (14) 
 𝑅𝑃𝑣>1  =  𝑅𝑃1  ∗  𝐶𝑂𝐿𝐴𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙
𝑣−1 (15) 
Where  
RP𝑣 = monthly retired pay in full calendar year v of retirement 
COLA0 = partial cost of living adjustment in first year of retirement 
COLAfull = cost of living adjustment applied annually after first year 
We use these formulas to determine the retired pay in each month of retirement.  
The member can specify his/her own life expectancy to determine the date when annuity 
payments stop.  We then substitute the generated stream of values into the net present 
value formula given by Equation 6, noting that t is the number of months elapsed since 
the base date.  We arrive at values for NPVHigh-3 annuity and NPVBRS annuity that can be used 
in Equations 3 and 4.  This completes our computation of NPVHigh-3.  However, NPVBRS 
still requires the computation of the present value of the continuation pay and DOD TSP 
accumulation. 
Continuation Pay 
Continuation Pay is contingent upon reaching 12 years of service, agreeing to 
serve an additional 4 years, and then completing that service commitment.  At that point 
the member will have 16 years of service.  We currently see very high retention rates 
beyond 16 years of service under the High-3 system.  Although members under the BRS 
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will have a reduced annuity incentive at 20 years of service, the marginal value of these 
last 4 years will still be very large.  We make the assumption that service members 
attaining 16 years of service will serve the additional 4 years to earn the retirement 
annuity.  Therefore, serving less than 20 years is equated with serving less than 16 years, 
and therefore receiving no continuation pay. 
 (𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦| 𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑦)  =  (𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦 | 𝑌𝑂𝑆 < 16)  =  0 (16) 
Where: 
(PVcontinuation pay|YOS = y) = present value of continuation pay at y years of service 
Next, to calculate (PVcontinuation pay| YOS=x), we first determine the basic pay at 12 
years of service using Equation 7.  This value is multiplied by the continuation pay 
multiplier (MCP) to obtain the nominal value of the continuation pay. 
 (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑥)  =  𝐵𝑃12 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠  ∗  𝑀𝐶𝑃 (17) 
Where: 
BP12 years = basic pay at 12 years of service 
MCP = continuation pay multiplier 
We can then use a modified version of Equation 6 to convert the continuation pay 
into base date terms, noting once again that d is a monthly rate and t is in terms of months 
since the base date. 
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 (𝑃𝑉𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦|𝑌𝑂𝑆 = 𝑥) =  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑎𝑦 ∗  (1 + 𝑑)
−𝑡 (18) 
Where: 
(PVcontinuation pay|YOS = x) = present value of continuation pay at x years of service 
t = number of months elapsed since the base date 
d = the personal discount rate per month 
PVcontinuation pay fills another element of Equation 3, leaving only the present value 
of the DOD TSP accumulation in order to complete our computation of NPVBRS. 
TSP Accumulation 
The accumulated value of the DOD TSP contributions at age 59.5 is dependent 
upon several factors.  First, the member designates the percentage of monthly basic pay 
he/she intends to contribute to the TSP.  Once a member has opted into the BRS, the 
DOD automatically contributes 1% of monthly basic pay to the member’s TSP account.  
In addition, starting in the third year of service, the DOD matches the member’s own TSP 
contributions in accordance with the TSP matching schedule shown in Table 1.  These 
DOD contributions continue until the member retires or reaches 26 years of service. 
Table 1. DOD Contribution Schedule 
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The maximum DOD contribution is 5% of basic pay (1% automatic and 4% 
match).  After 2 years of service and up until 26 years of service, the defined contribution 
by the DOD in month j (DCj) can be determined by the following equation: 
 𝐷𝐶𝑗 = 𝐵𝑃𝑗(𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑗, 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑗) ∗ (1% + 𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑐ℎ) (19) 
Where: 
DCj = DOD contribution at time j 
BPj(Gradej, YOSj) = basic pay at time j given grade and YOS at time j 
match = value from column 3 of Table 1, based on member contribution 
Next, the member supplies his/her expected age of workforce retirement.  This 
date is used to determine the TSP Lifecycle Fund in which the member should invest.  
The recommended TSP Lifecycle Fund can be determined from Table 2. 
Table 2. TSP Lifecycle Fund Recommendations 
 
By default, DOD TSP contributions will be made to an appropriate Lifecycle 
Fund based upon the member’s date of birth (Department of Defense, 2016:Q2.6).  The 
member can change the allocation of contributions manually at the TSP website.  We 
made the assumption of investment in the appropriate Lifecycle Fund because it is the 
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default and because these funds are designed to maximize the expected return for the 
given amount of risk.  Within our Excel model, the member can manually change the 
selected Lifecycle Fund to one with a later target date in order to pursue higher returns, or 
to one with an earlier target date in order to decrease risk.  TSP Lifecycle Funds maintain 
an optimal asset allocation among five broad index funds.  The details of the underlying 
index funds are omitted here but are discussed in length by the Federal Retirement Thrift 
Investment Board on the TSP website (2017).  The optimal allocation among the 
underlying funds is that which minimizes risk for a given expected rate of return.  When 
the member is far from his/her target retirement date, the asset allocation will target 
higher expected returns and accept the associated risks.  This allocation is maintained on 
a daily basis.  Each quarter, the allocation is adjusted to target a slightly lower level of 
risk, thereby accepting a slightly lower expected rate of return.   
TSP projects the asset allocations for each Lifecycle Fund up until the target 
retirement date.  TSP also publishes the historical annual returns for each of the 5 
underlying index funds.  Since DOD contributions will occur on a monthly basis and the 
allocation of the Lifecycle Fund will change on a quarterly basis, we convert the expected 
annual return of each underlying fund to an equivalent monthly return, E[Rf], using 
Equation 5.  We then calculate the expected return of the Lifecycle Fund as a weighted 
average of the returns of the underlying funds, with the weights being the proportion of 
the Lifecycle Fund allocated to each underlying fund.  
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𝐸[𝑅𝐿𝐹]𝑡  =  ∑ 𝐸[𝑅𝑓] ∗ (𝑎𝑓)𝑡
5
𝑓=1
 (20) 
Where: 
E[RLF]t = expected monthly return of the Lifecycle Fund 
E[Rf] = expected monthly return of underlying fund f 
(af)t = proportion of the Lifecycle Fund allocated to fund f at time t 
We previously alluded to the formula we used to determine the single 
accumulation month (am) of the TSP funds.  This point in time is defined as the greater 
of the month the member reaches age 59.5 or the month of retirement (k). 
 𝑎𝑚 =  𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑔𝑒59.5, 𝑘) (21) 
Where: 
am = accumulation month 
monthage59.5 = month during which the member reaches age 59.5 
k = member′s month of retirement 
The balance of the member’s TSP fund at the end of the accumulation month can 
then be computed by determining each nominal DOD contribution amount, increasing it 
by the expected return in each subsequent month up until the accumulation month, and 
summing for all DOD contributions made during the member’s career. 
 
𝐷𝑂𝐷 𝑇𝑆𝑃 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  ∑ [𝐷𝐶𝑙 ∗ ∏(1 + 𝐸[𝑅𝐿𝐹]𝑙)
𝑎𝑚
𝑙
]
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (𝑘,26𝑌𝑂𝑆)
𝑙=0
 (22) 
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Where: 
DC𝑙 = DOD contribution in month 𝑙 
E[RLF]𝑙 = expected monthly return of the Lifecycle Fund in month 𝑙 
𝑙 = number of months elapsed since the opt − in date 
k = month of retirement 
am = accumulation month 
Finally, we use the PV formula from Equation 18 to convert the nominal DOD 
TSP accumulation amount into base date terms.  
 𝑃𝑉𝐷𝑂𝐷 𝑇𝑆𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =  𝐷𝑂𝐷 𝑇𝑆𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ∗  (1 + 𝑑)
−𝑡 (23) 
Where: 
PVDOD 𝑇𝑆𝑃 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑚𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = present value of DOD TSP accumulation 
t = number of months elapsed since the base date 
d = the personal discount rate per month 
Summary 
We have now defined all values necessary to determine the NPV of choosing each 
retirement system.  Per Equation 4, the NPV of choosing the High-3 system is simply 
equal to the NPV of the High-3 annuity.   Per Equation 3, we sum the (net) present value 
of each BRS component to find the NPV of choosing the BRS.  We compute the NPV of 
choosing each system under the conditions of YOS = x and YOS = y.    We then use 
Equations 1 and 2 to determine the expected net present value of choosing each 
retirement system given the probability of reaching 20 years of service.   
In the analysis phase of our study, we demonstrate how the model can be used to 
provide a recommendation and insight for individuals.  To do so, we look at the results 
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for 26 typical career demographic groups, analyzing empirical data to estimate several 
key parameters from this methodology.  This allows us to also consider how this decision 
is similar and different among these demographic groups.  Finally, we conduct sensitivity 
and/or break-even analysis on several variables to provide the necessary flexibility given 
the difficulty of determining a precise value for those variables.  The results of our 
analysis are presented at the end of Chapter 4. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
The model developed requires up to 27 different input variables, depending on 
how far the member expects to progress in rank before retirement.  When utilizing this 
model to assist in making a personal decision, an individual member can specify each of 
these variables based on his/her own circumstances.  The model will provide 
personalized results based on the member’s inputs.   Many of these inputs are known by 
the member at the time the decision is being made (current rank, current YOS, gender, 
track, planned TSP contributions, etc.).  Other variables can be empirically estimated 
(inflation rate, wage growth rate, etc.).  Finally, a few variables are personal to the 
member, yet difficult to precisely estimate (personal discount rate, probability of 
attaining 20 years of service, expected CP Multiplier).  This last set of variables is where 
we will focus our analysis later in this chapter, looking specifically at certain 
demographics.  First, however, we will discuss the demographic groups we analyzed and 
the analysis and rationale supporting the values used for our estimated variables. 
Demographic Variables 
Although the model will produce valid results for any realistic situation, it is 
necessary to limit the scope of our analysis in order to focus on the most relevant and 
interesting results.  Nonetheless, we do wish to examine how the results change 
depending on a member’s track (officer/enlisted) and current years of service (0-12). We 
examine enlisted personnel who entered at age 19 and officers who entered at age 23.  
Similarly, we assume a typical rank progression based on years of service.  In this way, 
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age and rank are strictly a function of years of service and track.   Dividing the possible 
YOS range into year-groups (0-12) and considering both officers and enlisted, we create 
26 “typical” career demographics, as listed in Table 3.  For each career demographic, we 
also examine whether different life expectancies for males and females produce any 
appreciable differences in the results.  Of note, however, we do not make the distinction 
of branch of service among our demographic groups.  Since each service varies in regards 
to promotion rates, retention rates, and service lengths, this distinction may yield 
interesting differences in the results.  However, we leave that analysis as a 
recommendation for future research.  Our analysis treats the DOD as a whole, making 
demographic distinctions only on the basis of track, current years of service, and gender. 
Table 3. Demographic Groups Considered 
Officer Enlisted 
O-1, 0 YOS E-1, 0 YOS 
O-1, 1 YOS E-3, 1 YOS 
O-2, 2 YOS E-3, 2 YOS 
O-2, 3 YOS E-4, 3 YOS 
O-3, 4 YOS E-4, 4 YOS 
O-3, 5 YOS E-5, 5 YOS 
O-3, 6 YOS E-5, 6 YOS 
O-3, 7 YOS E-5, 7 YOS 
O-3, 8 YOS E-5, 8 YOS 
O-3, 9 YOS E-5, 9 YOS 
O-4, 10 YOS E-6, 10 YOS 
O-4, 11 YOS E-6, 11 YOS 
O-4, 12 YOS E-6, 12 YOS 
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Career Milestones 
For each demographic starting point in Table 3, we assume a standard career 
progression as the model projects future base pay.  For officers, we use the YOS targets 
established by the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) to forecast the 
future promotion dates for each year group (DOPMA, 1980: § 402).  These milestones are 
shown in Table 4.  For enlisted personnel, there are no established target dates for each 
promotion.  Enlisted personnel see more variation in their progression.  The enlisted rank 
progression we based our analysis on is also shown in Table 4.   
Table 4. Career Milestones Used 
Enlisted Officer 
Milestone YOS Milestone YOS 
E-1 0 O-1 0 
E-2 0.5 O-2 2 
E-3 1 O-3 4 
E-4 2.5 O-4 10 
E-5 4.5 O-5 16 
E-6 9.5     
E-7 14     
E[YOS|YOS≥20] 21.6 E[YOS|YOS≥20] 22.8 
 
We examined tables provided by the DOD Office of the Actuary and determined 
that the most common rank of officers currently in non-disability retirement is O-5.  
Among O-5 non-disability retirees, the average YOS at retirement is 22.8 years (DoD 
Office of the Actuary, 2016:141a).  Therefore, for each officer year-group, our results are 
based on the DOPMA rank progression up to retirement as a O-5 with the value of 
36 
E[YOS|YOS≥20] equal to 22.8.  The same retirement tables indicate that the most 
common enlisted rank at non-disability retirement is E-7.  Among E-7 non-disability 
retirees, the average YOS at retirement is 21.6 (DoD Office of the Actuary, 2016:141b).  
Therefore, we project enlisted progression out to the retirement rank of E-7, using 21.6 as 
the value of E[YOS|YOS≥20]. 
Early Separation 
Finally, we determine the value of E[YOS|YOS<20], or the expected years of 
service given that the member separates before retirement eligibility.  We examine 
retention data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center Reporting Service 
(DMCDRS) for the accession year-groups 1972-2013.  The data shows the number of 
non-prior service accessions in each year-group cohort, separated by officer and enlisted 
personnel.  The data then shows the number of each cohort remaining at each subsequent 
year of service mark.   
We first normalize this data across each year group by converting the raw counts 
at each YOS to a percentage of the originally accessed cohort.  We refer to the percentage 
of the original cohort remaining at year z as the cumulative retention rate (CRR) at year 
z, because this value represents the cumulative effects (product) of single-year retention 
rates up to year z.  It is important to note why we chose to normalize the data from each 
cohort first.  We did this primarily because the military has decreased in size over the 
past 40 years.  If we did not normalize the data first, then earlier year groups would have 
a larger impact due to the larger size of each cohort.  Due to unforeseen changes in 
policy, technology, and worldwide stability, there is no precise way for us to determine 
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the specific relationship between future retention rates and those in the 1970s or those in 
the 2000s.  However, common sense would tell us that future retention rates under the 
High-3 system are likely to be nearer in value to recent retention rates than they are to 
those from 40 years ago.  Furthermore, we make the assumption that the DOD will be 
successful in maintaining the current force profile using the continuation pay as a 
retention incentive, as was predicted by the MCRMC study (MCRMC, 2015:3).  
Therefore, it would be counter-intuitive for the older retention rates to have a larger 
impact on our estimate of future retention.   
However, we cannot simply rely on the most recent data either, as retention rates 
may also regress to the mean.  Therefore, we normalize the retention data within each 
cohort to determine the cohort’s CRR profile and then find the mean CRR at each year of 
service across all cohorts.  We arrive at the estimated CRR profiles provided in Table 5. 
From the estimated future CRR profile, we need to determine the expected YOS 
given that the member separates prior to the 20-year mark.  We first partition out that 
expected value as the sum product of the expected value of YOS in each year and the 
probability of separation in that year, given that separation occurs by year 20.  
 
𝐸[𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆|𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 20] = ∑ 𝐸[𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆|𝑧 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 𝑧 + 1]
19
𝑧=𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁
 
∗ 𝑃(𝑧 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 𝑧 + 1|𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 20) 
(24) 
Where: 
YOS𝑆 = years of service at separation 
YOS𝑁 = years of service now 
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Table 5. Average Normalized CRR Profile (1972-2013) 
Officer Enlisted 
SURVIVAL TIME CRR SURVIVAL TIME CRR 
ACCESSION 1 ACCESSION 1 
1 YR 0.9653 1 YR 0.8538 
2 YRS 0.9325 2 YRS 0.7694 
3 YRS 0.8783 3 YRS 0.6752 
4 YRS 0.7814 4 YRS 0.5258 
5 YRS 0.6915 5 YRS 0.3473 
6 YRS 0.6277 6 YRS 0.2915 
7 YRS 0.5690 7 YRS 0.2455 
8 YRS 0.5159 8 YRS 0.2140 
9 YRS 0.4685 9 YRS 0.1865 
10 YRS 0.4244 10 YRS 0.1655 
11 YRS 0.3867 11 YRS 0.1489 
12 YRS 0.3499 12 YRS 0.1372 
13 YRS 0.3223 13 YRS 0.1275 
14 YRS 0.3008 14 YRS 0.1198 
15 YRS 0.2822 15 YRS 0.1133 
16 YRS 0.2646 16 YRS 0.1073 
17 YRS 0.2469 17 YRS 0.1027 
18 YRS 0.2298 18 YRS 0.0989 
19 YRS 0.2138 19 YRS 0.0958 
20 YRS 0.1880 20 YRS 0.0918 
21 YRS 0.1416 21 YRS 0.0514 
22 YRS 0.1160 22 YRS 0.0405 
23 YRS 0.0963 23 YRS 0.0307 
24 YRS 0.0817 24 YRS 0.0242 
25 YRS 0.0691 25 YRS 0.0167 
26 YRS 0.0567 26 YRS 0.0129 
27 YRS 0.0438 27 YRS 0.0086 
28 YRS 0.0331 28 YRS 0.0061 
29 YRS 0.0233 29 YRS 0.0037 
30 YRS 0.0169 30 YRS 0.0029 
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Assuming that member separations are uniformly distributed throughout any 
given year, the expected value of YOSS given that separation occurs during year z is 
simply z+0.5. 
 𝐸[𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆|𝑧 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 𝑧 + 1] = 𝑧 + 0.5 (25) 
Where: 
YOS𝑆 = years of service at separation 
Also, we observe that the probability of separating in year z given that separation 
occurs between now and year 20 is equal to the unconditional probability of separation in 
year z divided by the unconditional probability of separation between now and year 20. 
 
𝑃(𝑧 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 𝑧 + 1|𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 20) =   
𝑃(𝑧 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 𝑧 + 1)
𝑃(𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 20)
 (26) 
Where: 
YOS𝑆 = years of service at separation 
YOS𝑁 = years of service now 
Using our CRR profiles, we can easily determine the value of the numerator and 
denominator in Equation 26.  For the numerator, we subtract the CRR for year z + 1 from 
the CRR for year z. 
 𝑃(𝑧 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 𝑧 + 1) =  𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑧 − 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑧+1 (27) 
Where: 
YOS𝑆 = years of service at separation 
CRR𝑧 = cumulative retention rate at year z 
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For the denominator, we subtract the 20-year CRR from the current year CRR. 
 𝑃(𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 20) =  𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑁 − 𝐶𝑅𝑅20 (28) 
Where: 
YOS𝑆 = years of service at separation 
YOS𝑁 = years of service now 
CRR𝑧 = cumulative retention rate at year z 
We have now distilled Equation 24 down to the following: 
 
𝐸[𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆|𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁 < 𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑆 < 20] = ∑ (𝑧 + 0.5)
19
𝑧=𝑌𝑂𝑆𝑁
  
 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑧 − 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑧+1
𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑁 − 𝐶𝑅𝑅20
    (29) 
Where: 
YOS𝑆 = years of service at separation 
YOS𝑁 = years of service now 
CRR𝑧 = cumulative retention rate at year z 
For any current years of service N, we can now determine the expected years of 
service given that the member separates before reaching 20 years.  Starting with the CRR 
values in Table 5, this procedure is used to determine the expected year of separation for 
officers and enlisted personnel separating before 20 years, given their current YOS.  
These values are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Expected YOSS given YOSS < 20 
Current YOS Officer Enlisted 
0 7.74 4.44 
1 8.06 5.20 
2 8.35 5.66 
3 8.81 6.17 
4 9.68 7.09 
5 10.61 8.90 
6 11.35 9.85 
7 12.09 10.86 
8 12.84 11.72 
9 13.57 12.66 
10 14.33 13.55 
11 15.06 14.44 
12 15.86 15.20 
13 16.55 15.93 
14 17.14 16.61 
15 17.66 17.25 
16 18.15 17.92 
17 18.65 18.52 
18 19.12 19.06 
19 19.50 19.50 
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Market Conditions 
We previously addressed the method by which we projected the growth rate of the 
member’s TSP account for each quarter.  This methodology is built into the model and 
only requires the member to designate the age at which he/she plans to retire in order to 
determine the recommended TSP fund.  For the purposes of this study, we set this value 
to age 62 for all demographic groups.  Based on that value, Lifecycle 2050 is the fund 
recommended by TSP for all of our demographic groups.   
The wage growth rate (g) is the rate at which the member expects military pay to 
increase over the length of his/her career.  There is a statutory formula that determines the 
increase each year based on the Employment Cost Index.  Congress has the ability to 
“override” this statutory formula, and they have done so on several occasions in the past.  
However, periods marked by increases falling short of ECI growth have inevitably been 
followed by periods marked by increases greater than ECI growth.  It is a fair assumption 
that wage growth will, on average, keep up with ECI growth.  Therefore, we seek to 
determine the long-term ECI growth rate.  We obtained tables from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, the organization responsible for determining the ECI each month (2016b).  
Using the statutory formula for the default military pay increase, we calculated the ECI 
growth for each year starting in September 1980 until September 2016.  We then took the 
arithmetic average of these yearly rates to determine the expected ECI growth rate.  
According to McCulloch (2004), the arithmetic average is a more accurate statistic for 
prospective financial modeling than the geometric average, or geometric return.  With a 
distant time horizon, the geometric average underestimates the expected annual increase 
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each year, which we observed in this case.  The arithmetic average of the yearly ECI 
increases provides us with our expected annual wage growth rate of 3.67%. 
The Bureau of Labor Statistics provides similar tables for the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), a measure of inflation (2016a).  We examined data from the years 1913 
through 2015.  Again, we computed the percentage increase for each individual year.  
Due to the longer time horizon, the geometric average underestimates the expected 
annual return by an even greater amount.  The arithmetic average provides us with our 
expected annual rate of inflation, 3.24%. 
Other Variables 
For our analysis, we used the first day that members are able to opt in to the BRS, 
1 January 2018, as the base date for discounting cashflows.  This gives us the net present 
value at the time the decision is made.  This date also serves as an appropriate base date 
for making comparisons since it is common to all members facing this decision. Once 
again, the choice of base date does not affect the results as long as it is consistently 
applied. 
In order to estimate life expectancy for these demographic groups, we consulted 
tables provided by the DOD Office of the Actuary (2016:283–284).  The applicable 
portions of these tables are adapted and shown in Table 7.  Since life expectancy is only 
relevant to the NPV computation of earned annuities, we enter the table at the member’s 
age upon reaching 20 years of service.  We then find the life expectancy of the member 
from the appropriate column of the table. 
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Table 7. Life Expectancy of Retirees 
Age at  
20 YOS 
Officer Enlisted 
Male Female Male Female 
38 84.5 85.5 79.6 82.6 
39 84.5 85.6 79.7 82.7 
40 84.5 85.6 79.8 82.7 
41 84.6 85.7 79.9 82.7 
42 84.6 85.7 80.0 82.8 
43 84.6 85.7 80.0 82.8 
44 84.7 85.8 80.1 82.9 
45 84.7 85.8 80.2 82.9 
46 84.7 85.9 80.2 83.0 
47 84.8 85.9 80.3 83.0 
48 84.8 86.0 80.3 83.1 
49 84.8 86.0 80.4 83.2 
50 84.9 86.1 80.5 83.2 
51 84.9 86.1 80.6 83.3 
52 85.0 86.2 80.6 83.4 
53 85.0 86.2 80.7 83.5 
54 85.1 86.3 80.8 83.5 
55 85.1 86.3 81.0 83.6 
56 85.2 86.4 81.1 83.7 
57 85.3 86.5 81.2 83.9 
58 85.3 86.5 81.4 84.0 
59 85.4 86.6 81.5 84.1 
60 85.5 86.7 81.7 84.2 
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Because this portion of the analysis attempts to identify the alternative that 
specific demographics “should” choose, we assumed the value of two variables based on 
sound financial advice.  The first variable is the member’s TSP contribution rate.  We 
assume a member will choose to contribute at least 5% of his/her pay in order to get the 
full DOD match under the BRS. Empirically, we know that not all members will do this. 
However, it is widely agreed that individuals planning for retirement should take full 
advantage of matching contributions.  The only exception may be the case of an 
extremely high personal discount rate.  This portion of our analysis assumes that the 
member will contribute 5%. 
The other assumption we made is that all of our demographic groups would make 
their decision on 1 January, 2018.  Under the BRS, TSP contributions from the DOD do 
not start until the member opts in.  Therefore, the BRS alternative will lose some value 
over the year 2018 if the member does not opt-in right away.  If the BRS was not the 
member’s preference at the beginning of the year, we do not expect the member to 
change his/her mind from a financial point of view during the year.  The exception would 
be when the additional time allows for a more precise estimate of the probability of 
staying in 20 years, the expected CP multiplier, or the expected rank progression.  In that 
case, the analysis would be run again with the new inputs.  However, for this study we 
simply look at the initial decision faced at the beginning of 2018. 
Variables for Further Analysis 
Each of the variables addressed so far are either known to the member or can be 
estimated or assumed with reasonable accuracy.  The final three variables that we discuss 
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may be more difficult to estimate with any precision.  First, personal discount rates can 
vary considerably from one person to another.  When conducting net present value 
analysis with a very distant time horizon, such as in retirement planning, the chosen 
discount rate can have a very large effect on the results.  Rather than asking the member 
to pinpoint a PDR, sensitivity analysis can be performed on this variable to determine the 
intervals over which each alternative is preferred. We start with a minimum annual PDR 
of 2% and then increase it in 1% increments until reaching a PDR of 20%.   
Establishing a probability of reaching 20 years of service, P(YOS≥20), requires a 
member to forecast his or her own future.  Only 49% of officers and 17% of enlisted 
personnel ever reach retirement eligibility (DoD Office of the Actuary, 2014:23).  
However, most of our demographics already have several years of service.  Therefore, 
not considering any further information, their probabilities of reaching 20 years will be 
higher.  We could easily estimate this probability for any given member of a cohort by 
dividing the average CRR at year 20 (from Table 5) by the CRR for the current years of 
service.  We could even enhance that estimate with current strength and retention 
numbers for the specific cohort.  Yet we expect that members will have a much better 
idea of their own probability of reaching 20 years, which may vary greatly from the 
overall cohort.  Therefore, we include P(YOS≥20) as a second variable in our sensitivity 
analysis.  We look at the entire range of possible values, from 0 to 1, with results 
recorded at each 0.05 interval. 
Finally, the continuation pay multiplier (MCP) represents the number of months of 
basic pay the member is offered at 12 years of service in return for staying an additional 4 
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years.  The 2016 NDAA established a minimum MCP of 2.5 and a maximum MCP of 13 
for all service members falling under the BRS.  No further guidance has been given by 
the DOD or any of the services.  In fact, the DoD made a request to Congress for more 
flexibility in determining MCP rates.  The DOD intends to use the continuation pay more 
as a retention tool, rather than as an automatic retirement benefit (Tilghman, 2016).  The 
request for more flexibility has not been approved, but it suggests that service members 
in different services, career fields, and year groups may very well see significant 
variation in the MCP offered by the DOD.  In 2018, as some members opt into the BRS 
near their 12-year mark, we will get a better idea of the likely range of MCP values and 
what demographics the DOD will target for retention.  In anticipation of that information, 
we include the extremes of MCP [2.5, 13] in our sensitivity analysis in order to determine 
the range of possibilities we might face.  However, instead of varying this value 
incrementally over that range, we conduct break-even analysis for each of our 
demographic groups at each combination of PDR and P(YOS≥20).   
Due to the complexity of our model, we are unable to formulate it into a problem 
that can be solved to find the breakeven MCP. Microsoft Excel’s Solver utility also failed 
to find a solution method.  Therefore, we employ an algorithm which varies the value of 
MCP incrementally until a solution is found.  We first define the variable Diff as the 
difference between the expected net present value of the two retirement systems.  
 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 =  𝐸[𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ−3] − 𝐸[𝑁𝑃𝑉𝐵𝑅𝑆] (30) 
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The breakeven algorithm starts at the lower bound of MCP (zero) and increases 
incrementally until the absolute value of Diff is less than 1.  A snapshot of all variables 
and results is taken before the code moves on to the next PDR and/or P(YOS≥20). 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The first thing that we discovered in this portion of our analysis is that the 
difference between males and females due to longer female life expectancy was very 
small.  Every chart was filtered on gender and the change was rarely noticeable. This is 
due to the extremely high cumulative discount applied to retired pay received at the end 
of a lifetime, 50-60 years from now.  The cases where it impacts the preferred alternative 
are shown in the final portion of our analysis.   
Figure 1 comes from our sensitivity analysis and shows the extreme values of Diff 
for each of our 26 demographics.  Positive values of Diff result when the E[NPVHigh-3] is 
greater than E[NPVBRS], while negative values of Diff identify circumstances where the 
BRS is preferred. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that none of our 26 demographics have a straightforward 
decision. Our initial hope was that we could eliminate some demographics from the rest 
of our analysis due to one alternative dominating the other for all feasible values of PDR, 
P(YOS≥20), and MCP, but there is no such case.  For every year group of officers and 
enlisted personnel, there is at least one feasible combination of PDR, P(YOS≥20), and 
MCP where each retirement alternative is preferred.  We observe that the High-3 system 
has the potential to beat the BRS by over $500,000 in Expected Net Present Value, while 
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the BRS never beats High-3 by more than about $80,000.  However, this is simply due to 
the fact that we are looking at extremes here.  The maximum Diff values shown on this 
chart are a product of an extremely low 2% PDR and an absolute certainty of staying in 
for 20 years, P(YOS≥20) = 1.   
 
Figure 1.  Range of Diff Values 
 
In Figure 2, we have broken out the maximum Diff values of officers by PDR 
rate, so that each line represents the maximum at that PDR.  We can now see how those 
maximum Diff values for the High-3 system drop extremely fast when the PDR is 
increased, tapering off in the middle of our PDR range.  The maximum Diff values for a 
PDR of about 7-8% are in the same absolute range as the min Diff values from Figure 1. 
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Figure 2.  Sensitivity of Maximum Diff to PDR (officers only) 
 
Figure 3 shows a final example of how the value of each alternative changes 
across different year groups facing this decision.  This chart shows data for enlisted 
personnel with a PDR of 8% and a P(YOS≥20) of 0.20.  The charts using other values of 
these variables show the same general trend.  
The blue and red lines represent the expected net present value of the BRS given 
the minimum and maximum continuation pay multipliers, 2.5 and 13.   The black line 
shows the value of the High-3 system.  There is only one High-3 line because the High-3 
system does not incorporate any continuation payment.  Each successive year group has a 
higher expected value for both alternatives because they are a year closer to all future 
cashflows.  Relative to the two BRS lines, the black High-3 line moves down with 
increases in the PDR and up with increases in the probability of staying until 20 years.  
This is intuitive since the High-3 system includes higher annual cashflow in retirement.   
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The current chart shows a condition where all year groups are uncertain which 
alternative to choose.  This is because the value of the High-3 system is completely 
within the range of the possible values of the BRS.  If the black High-3 line falls below 
the blue line for any given year group, then the BRS will be the preferred choice because 
it will no longer matter what continuation pay multiplier the member is offered.  The 
BRS alternative will dominate for that year group even at the minimum MCP of 2.5.   
On the other hand, if the black High-3 line rises above the red line for any given 
year group, then the High-3 system will dominate the BRS even if the member is offered 
the maximum continuation pay multiplier of 13.   
 
Figure 3.  Sensitivity of E[NPV] to Current YOS (Enlisted, p=0.2, PDR=8%) 
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Break-even Analysis 
This last portion of our analysis is probably the most useful for the decision 
maker.  Figure 4 shows a policy chart which incorporates all three of the variables that 
service members are likely to have trouble putting a precise value on. This specific chart 
is for male officers just reaching O-3 at 4 years of service.  The policy charts for every 
other demographic are provided in the appendices. 
 
Figure 4.  Example Break-Even Policy Chart 
 
For each PDR on the horizontal axis and P(YOS>=20) on the vertical axis, we 
identify the MCP that results in parity between the two alternatives.  Then, based upon the 
current maximum MCP of 13, we identify all regions with a higher breakeven value as 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 61.8 44.3 32.4 24.2 18.5 14.4 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.95 61.2 43.9 32.1 24.0 18.3 14.2 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 60.6 43.4 31.7 23.7 18.0 14.0 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.85 60.0 42.9 31.3 23.4 17.8 13.8 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.80 59.2 42.3 30.9 23.0 17.5 13.6 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.75 58.4 41.7 30.3 22.6 17.2 13.3 10.6 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.70 57.4 40.9 29.7 22.1 16.8 13.0 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7
0.65 56.3 40.0 29.0 21.5 16.4 12.7 10.1 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.60 55.0 39.0 28.2 20.9 15.8 12.3 9.8 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 53.5 37.8 27.3 20.1 15.2 11.8 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.50 51.6 36.3 26.1 19.2 14.5 11.2 8.9 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 49.3 34.5 24.7 18.1 13.6 10.5 8.4 6.8 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.40 46.5 32.3 23.0 16.7 12.5 9.7 7.7 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 42.9 29.5 20.7 15.0 11.1 8.5 6.8 5.5 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 38.1 25.7 17.7 12.6 9.2 7.0 5.6 4.6 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.25 31.3 20.3 13.5 9.2 6.6 5.0 3.9 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 21.1 12.3 7.2 4.3 2.6 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.15 4.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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conditions under which the member should choose the High-3 system. These areas are 
shaded blue.  The green shaded region represents the cases where the member should 
choose the BRS because the MCP will always be higher than the breakeven value (under 
current law).  The cells without any value are cases where a negative multiplier would be 
necessary in order for the High-3 system to be preferred. 
Finally, the gray area is our current realm of uncertainty.  As the DOD releases 
more information leading up to and during 2018, the member can use these charts to see 
whether the expected CP multiplier meets the break-even threshold.  If the CP multiplier 
is expected to be greater than the breakeven value, then the member should opt into the 
BRS.  If the expected CP multiplier falls short of the breakeven value, then the member 
should remain in the High-3 system and consider re-evaluating later in the year. 
Additionally, if the member is more unsure of one of the variables on the axes, 
he/she can start with the other axis and then scan for the expected CP multiplier to 
determine the approximate break-even value of the unknown variable.  For example, if 
the member is fairly sure that their personal discount rate is about 8%, and they expect a 
continuation pay multiplier of 7, then they can scan upward from 8% to find where their 
multiplier of 7 lies, and then scan left to find the breakeven probability of reaching 
retirement. 
Using these charts, members can identify the range of uncertainty on each 
variable and then see if it makes any difference in the decision they should make. 
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Summary 
The analysis in this chapter demonstrated that there are no dominant strategies for 
any of our demographics given the entire feasible range of personal discount rates, 
probabilities of staying until 20 years, and continuation pay multipliers.  However, it is 
possible that certain members may find a dominant strategy after entering their own 
personal inputs.   
We determined that the NPV of both alternatives will rise with the current YOS of 
the member since he/she will be closer to all future cashflows.  Also, higher personal 
discount rates and lower probabilities of staying until 20 years generally tend to favor the 
BRS.  On the other hand, lower personal discount rates and higher probabilities of staying 
until 20 years generally tend to favor the High-3 alternative.  However, these generalities 
by themselves do not provide enough information for a member to make an informed 
decision.  Each member is advised to personalize their results rather than relying solely 
on the demographic policy charts provided. 
Since we are uncertain of the continuation pay multiplier within the range of 2.5-
13, members will need to narrow down the likely range of this variable and/or one of the 
other uncertainty variables.  If a member can do this, then he/she can use his own 
personally generated policy chart to find the breakeven points (or the breakeven range) of 
the variables.  The member will need to continue narrowing this range until one of the 
alternatives dominates over the remaining range of each variable.  In this way, members 
can come to a decision that is best for them without having to place an exact value on 
these three variables.  Meanwhile, the member can also determine the robustness of their 
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own decision by using the policy charts to identify the range of each variable over which 
their preferred alternative stands. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusions of Research 
The 2018 military retirement decision requires a very personal assessment of the 
alternatives from several different perspectives.  This thesis has provided a framework for 
evaluating the decision from a strictly financial viewpoint.  To conclude, we will address 
each of our original research questions.   
1. Given a service member’s particular circumstances, how do we quantity the value of 
each retirement system in a way that the member can follow?   
We found the best way to do so was an expected net present value model.  We can 
compare the expected net present value of each option, and most service members 
should be able to understand everything we accounted for, even if they don’t 
understand every aspect of our methodology.  We considered more complex 
models that incorporated measures of risk and risk tolerance, but we determined 
that these measures would depart from the normative nature of our model while 
making it less transparent for the decision maker. 
2. Under what general conditions are each of the alternatives preferred?  
We found that the BRS is generally preferred at higher personal discount rates 
whereas the High-3 system is generally preferred at low personal discount rates.  
The High-3 system is generally preferred at higher probabilities of staying in for 
20 years, whereas the BRS is preferred for lower probabilities.  From the policy 
charts, we can conclude that any member in our demographic groups with a PDR 
of 20% or higher should choose to opt into the BRS. The BRS is also the 
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preferred option for all officer demographic groups with a probability of staying 
in until retirement at 0.10 or lower.  Finally, we found no significant difference 
between males and females due to life expectancy since cashflows at the end of a 
lifetime are heavily discounted. 
3. How does the decision differ among various demographic groups?   
 - and - 
4. At what point does the recommended alternative change as a member’s 
circumstances change?    
Both of these questions are answered by our policy charts.  We provide break-
even policy charts for 26 typical career demographics that can be used to 
determine the best alternative as more information regarding likely CP multipliers 
becomes available.  Members can also generate a personal policy chart using our 
Excel/VBA model and their own inputs.  This will allow them to determine their 
personal breakeven points given their own inputs to the model.     
Recommendations for Future Research 
Finally, for anyone wishing to continue this research, we propose the following 
recommendations. First, there are a multitude of additional variables and potential 
dependencies between variables that could be investigated.  One of the most interesting 
may be the member’s service branch, since promotion rates and retention are different in 
each service.   
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Also, the model could be made more descriptive by incorporating a measure of 
risk and risk tolerance.  We could establish distributions on our variables of uncertainty 
with further analysis of empirical data, for example, the distribution of investment 
outcomes.  Distributions on personal variables could be elicited from the member.  A 
certain equivalent for each alternative could then be determined and compared rather than 
using the expected value.  Given empirical data on the military populations of interest, 
enhancing the model in this way may allow it to be used to predict behavior such as opt-
in levels and retention. 
Finally, one of our limitations in this research was that the member’s probability 
of earning a retirement pension, expected service length, and TSP contributions did not 
change depending upon which alternative was selected.  We made the assumption that the 
continuation payments would allow the DOD and services to maintain the current force 
profile.  In reality, a member will face a different set of incentives under each system. 
Exploring and incorporating these elements can potentially provide more descriptive 
insight into how things may unfold.   
Summary 
When making this important decision in 2018, service members need to account 
for many things.  The financial implications will likely be a large consideration.  We have 
shown that an expected net present value model can provide service members with the 
insight necessary to make an informed financial decision between the High-3 Retirement 
System and the Blended Retirement System.  Generally, members will find that higher 
personal discount rates will tend to favor the BRS while higher probabilities of staying in 
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until 20 years will tend to favor the High-3 system.  Unfortunately, the current 
uncertainty surrounding the continuation pay multiplier creates a large “gray area” for 
many individuals.  However, members can use the model created by this research effort 
in order to generate personalized policy tables using their own inputs.  This will allow the 
member to identify ranges over which each alternative should be preferred from a strictly 
financial point of view, and then revisit the decision as more information comes 
available.  In this way, members can achieve clarity of thought and action as they 
approach the 2018 opt-in window.   
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Appendix A: Enlisted Policy Tables 
  
 
Figure 5.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 0 YOS / E-1 / male 
  
 
 
Figure 6.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 0 YOS / E-1 / female 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 51.5 38.2 29.0 22.6 17.9 14.6 12.0 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.95 51.2 38.0 28.9 22.5 17.9 14.5 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.90 50.9 37.8 28.7 22.3 17.8 14.4 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.85 50.6 37.5 28.5 22.2 17.7 14.3 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.80 50.3 37.3 28.3 22.0 17.5 14.2 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 49.9 37.0 28.1 21.9 17.4 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 49.4 36.6 27.8 21.7 17.3 14.0 11.6 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 48.9 36.2 27.5 21.4 17.1 13.9 11.5 9.7 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 48.3 35.7 27.2 21.2 16.9 13.7 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 47.5 35.2 26.7 20.8 16.6 13.5 11.2 9.5 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 46.7 34.5 26.2 20.5 16.3 13.3 11.1 9.3 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 45.6 33.7 25.6 20.0 16.0 13.0 10.9 9.2 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 44.2 32.7 24.8 19.4 15.5 12.7 10.6 9.0 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 42.5 31.4 23.9 18.6 15.0 12.3 10.3 8.7 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.4 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 40.2 29.6 22.5 17.6 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 37.0 27.2 20.7 16.2 13.1 10.9 9.2 7.9 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.20 32.2 23.6 17.9 14.1 11.5 9.6 8.2 7.2 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2
0.15 24.1 17.5 13.3 10.6 8.8 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.10 8.0 5.3 4.0 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 60.1 43.5 32.3 24.6 19.2 15.3 12.5 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.95 59.9 43.3 32.1 24.5 19.1 15.3 12.5 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.90 59.6 43.1 32.0 24.4 19.0 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.85 59.3 42.8 31.8 24.2 18.9 15.1 12.3 10.3 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.80 58.9 42.6 31.6 24.1 18.8 15.0 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 58.5 42.3 31.4 23.9 18.7 14.9 12.2 10.1 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 58.1 41.9 31.1 23.7 18.5 14.8 12.1 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 57.5 41.5 30.8 23.5 18.3 14.7 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 56.9 41.0 30.4 23.2 18.1 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 56.2 40.5 30.0 22.9 17.9 14.3 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 55.3 39.8 29.5 22.5 17.6 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 54.2 39.0 28.9 22.0 17.2 13.8 11.4 9.5 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 52.9 38.0 28.1 21.4 16.8 13.5 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 51.2 36.7 27.1 20.7 16.2 13.1 10.8 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 48.9 35.0 25.8 19.7 15.4 12.5 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 45.6 32.5 23.9 18.3 14.4 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.20 40.8 28.9 21.2 16.1 12.8 10.4 8.7 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.15 32.8 22.8 16.5 12.6 10.1 8.3 7.1 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.10 16.7 10.6 7.3 5.6 4.7 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 7.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 1 YOS / E-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 8.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 1 YOS / E-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 51.1 37.9 28.8 22.4 17.8 14.5 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.95 50.8 37.6 28.6 22.3 17.7 14.4 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.90 50.4 37.4 28.4 22.1 17.6 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.85 50.0 37.1 28.2 21.9 17.5 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.80 49.6 36.7 27.9 21.7 17.3 14.1 11.6 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 49.1 36.3 27.6 21.5 17.1 13.9 11.5 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 48.5 35.9 27.3 21.2 16.9 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 47.8 35.4 26.9 21.0 16.7 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 47.0 34.8 26.4 20.6 16.4 13.4 11.1 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 46.1 34.1 25.9 20.2 16.1 13.2 11.0 9.2 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 45.0 33.2 25.3 19.7 15.8 12.9 10.7 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.9 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.45 43.6 32.2 24.5 19.1 15.3 12.5 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.40 41.9 30.9 23.5 18.4 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 39.7 29.3 22.2 17.4 14.0 11.5 9.7 8.3 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 36.8 27.1 20.6 16.1 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.8 6.8 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.25 32.7 24.0 18.2 14.3 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.2 6.4 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 26.6 19.3 14.7 11.7 9.6 8.2 7.1 6.3 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 16.4 11.6 8.8 7.2 6.2 5.6 5.1 4.8 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- 0.3 1.1 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 59.8 43.2 32.1 24.4 19.1 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.95 59.4 43.0 31.9 24.3 19.0 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.90 59.1 42.7 31.7 24.1 18.8 15.1 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.85 58.7 42.4 31.4 23.9 18.7 15.0 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.80 58.2 42.0 31.2 23.7 18.6 14.8 12.1 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 57.7 41.6 30.9 23.5 18.4 14.7 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 57.1 41.2 30.5 23.3 18.2 14.6 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 56.5 40.7 30.2 23.0 18.0 14.4 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 55.7 40.1 29.7 22.6 17.7 14.2 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 54.7 39.4 29.2 22.2 17.4 14.0 11.4 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 53.6 38.6 28.5 21.7 17.0 13.7 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 52.3 37.5 27.7 21.1 16.6 13.3 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.40 50.6 36.2 26.8 20.4 16.0 12.9 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 48.4 34.6 25.5 19.4 15.3 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 45.5 32.4 23.8 18.2 14.3 11.6 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.25 41.4 29.3 21.5 16.4 12.9 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 35.2 24.6 18.0 13.7 10.9 9.0 7.6 6.6 5.8 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 25.0 16.9 12.1 9.2 7.5 6.4 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 4.6 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.1 1.6 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 9.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 2 YOS / E-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 2 YOS / E-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 50.9 37.8 28.7 22.3 17.8 14.4 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.95 50.6 37.5 28.5 22.2 17.6 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.90 50.2 37.2 28.3 22.0 17.5 14.2 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.85 49.7 36.9 28.0 21.8 17.4 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.80 49.2 36.5 27.7 21.6 17.2 14.0 11.6 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 48.7 36.1 27.4 21.3 17.0 13.8 11.5 9.6 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 48.0 35.6 27.0 21.1 16.8 13.7 11.3 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 47.3 35.0 26.6 20.7 16.6 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 46.4 34.4 26.1 20.4 16.3 13.3 11.0 9.3 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 45.4 33.6 25.5 19.9 15.9 13.0 10.8 9.2 7.8 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 44.2 32.7 24.8 19.4 15.5 12.7 10.6 9.0 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.45 42.7 31.5 24.0 18.7 15.0 12.3 10.3 8.7 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.40 40.8 30.1 22.9 17.9 14.4 11.8 9.9 8.5 7.3 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.35 38.4 28.3 21.5 16.9 13.6 11.2 9.5 8.1 7.0 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.30 35.2 25.9 19.7 15.5 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.25 30.7 22.5 17.1 13.5 11.0 9.3 8.0 6.9 6.1 5.5 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1
0.20 24.0 17.4 13.2 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.6 5.9 5.3 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 12.8 8.9 6.8 5.6 5.0 4.7 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.1
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 59.6 43.1 32.0 24.4 19.0 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.95 59.2 42.8 31.8 24.2 18.9 15.1 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.90 58.8 42.5 31.5 24.0 18.8 15.0 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.85 58.4 42.2 31.3 23.8 18.6 14.9 12.2 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.80 57.9 41.8 31.0 23.6 18.5 14.8 12.1 10.0 8.5 7.2 6.3 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 57.3 41.4 30.7 23.4 18.3 14.6 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 56.7 40.9 30.3 23.1 18.1 14.5 11.8 9.9 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 55.9 40.3 29.9 22.8 17.8 14.3 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 55.1 39.7 29.4 22.4 17.5 14.1 11.5 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 54.1 38.9 28.8 21.9 17.2 13.8 11.3 9.5 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 52.8 38.0 28.1 21.4 16.8 13.5 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.45 51.3 36.8 27.2 20.8 16.3 13.1 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.40 49.5 35.4 26.2 19.9 15.7 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.35 47.1 33.6 24.8 18.9 14.8 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 43.9 31.2 22.9 17.5 13.8 11.2 9.3 7.9 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.25 39.4 27.8 20.4 15.5 12.3 10.0 8.4 7.3 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1
0.20 32.7 22.7 16.5 12.6 10.0 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 21.4 14.2 10.0 7.7 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 1.2 1.6 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
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Figure 11.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 3 YOS / E-4 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 12.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 3 YOS / E-4 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 52.4 38.9 29.5 23.0 18.2 14.8 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.95 52.1 38.6 29.3 22.8 18.1 14.7 12.1 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.90 51.7 38.3 29.1 22.7 18.0 14.6 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.85 51.3 38.0 28.9 22.5 17.9 14.5 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.80 50.9 37.7 28.6 22.3 17.7 14.4 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 50.3 37.3 28.3 22.1 17.6 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 49.7 36.9 28.0 21.8 17.4 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 49.1 36.3 27.6 21.5 17.1 13.9 11.5 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 48.3 35.7 27.1 21.1 16.9 13.7 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 47.3 35.0 26.6 20.7 16.5 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 46.2 34.2 26.0 20.2 16.2 13.2 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.8 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 44.8 33.1 25.2 19.6 15.7 12.8 10.7 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.40 43.1 31.8 24.2 18.9 15.1 12.4 10.4 8.8 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 40.8 30.1 22.9 17.9 14.4 11.8 9.9 8.5 7.3 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 37.9 27.9 21.2 16.6 13.4 11.1 9.3 8.0 7.0 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.25 33.7 24.7 18.8 14.8 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.4 6.5 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 27.5 20.0 15.2 12.1 9.9 8.4 7.3 6.4 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 17.1 12.1 9.2 7.5 6.5 5.8 5.3 4.9 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 61.1 44.2 32.8 25.0 19.5 15.6 12.7 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.95 60.8 43.9 32.6 24.9 19.4 15.5 12.6 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.90 60.4 43.7 32.4 24.7 19.3 15.4 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.85 60.0 43.4 32.2 24.5 19.1 15.3 12.5 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.80 59.5 43.0 31.9 24.3 19.0 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.75 59.0 42.6 31.6 24.1 18.8 15.0 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.70 58.4 42.2 31.3 23.8 18.6 14.9 12.2 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 57.7 41.7 30.9 23.5 18.4 14.7 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 56.9 41.1 30.4 23.2 18.1 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 56.0 40.3 29.9 22.8 17.8 14.3 11.7 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 54.9 39.5 29.2 22.3 17.4 14.0 11.5 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 53.5 38.4 28.4 21.7 17.0 13.6 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 51.7 37.1 27.4 20.9 16.4 13.2 10.9 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 49.5 35.4 26.2 19.9 15.6 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 46.6 33.2 24.5 18.6 14.7 11.9 9.8 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.25 42.4 30.0 22.1 16.8 13.3 10.8 9.0 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 36.2 25.3 18.5 14.1 11.2 9.2 7.8 6.8 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 25.8 17.5 12.5 9.5 7.7 6.6 5.8 5.2 4.7 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 5.0 1.7 0.6 0.5 0.8 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
E-4  /  3 YOS  /  female
personal discount rate (annual)
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
re
ac
h
in
g 
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
 (
>
2
0
 Y
O
S)
64 
 
 
Figure 13.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 4 YOS / E-4 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 14.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 4 YOS / E-4 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 53.5 39.7 30.2 23.5 18.6 15.1 12.4 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.95 53.2 39.5 30.0 23.3 18.5 15.0 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.90 52.8 39.2 29.8 23.2 18.4 14.9 12.3 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.85 52.4 38.9 29.5 23.0 18.3 14.8 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.80 51.9 38.5 29.3 22.8 18.1 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.75 51.4 38.1 29.0 22.5 17.9 14.5 12.0 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.70 50.8 37.7 28.6 22.3 17.7 14.4 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 50.1 37.1 28.2 22.0 17.5 14.2 11.7 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 49.3 36.5 27.8 21.6 17.2 14.0 11.6 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 48.3 35.8 27.2 21.2 16.9 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 47.2 34.9 26.5 20.7 16.5 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 45.8 33.9 25.7 20.1 16.0 13.1 10.9 9.2 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 44.0 32.5 24.7 19.3 15.5 12.7 10.6 8.9 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 41.8 30.8 23.4 18.3 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 38.8 28.5 21.7 17.0 13.7 11.3 9.5 8.1 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 34.5 25.4 19.3 15.2 12.3 10.2 8.7 7.5 6.6 5.8 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 28.2 20.6 15.6 12.4 10.2 8.6 7.5 6.6 5.8 5.2 4.7 4.3 3.8 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 17.7 12.6 9.6 7.8 6.7 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.2 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 62.1 45.0 33.4 25.5 19.9 15.9 12.9 10.7 9.0 7.6 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.95 61.8 44.8 33.3 25.3 19.8 15.8 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.90 61.4 44.5 33.0 25.2 19.6 15.7 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.85 61.0 44.2 32.8 25.0 19.5 15.6 12.7 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.80 60.6 43.8 32.5 24.8 19.4 15.5 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.75 60.0 43.4 32.2 24.6 19.2 15.3 12.5 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.70 59.4 43.0 31.9 24.3 19.0 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.65 58.7 42.4 31.5 24.0 18.7 15.0 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 57.9 41.8 31.0 23.6 18.5 14.8 12.1 10.0 8.5 7.2 6.3 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 57.0 41.1 30.5 23.2 18.2 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 55.8 40.2 29.8 22.7 17.8 14.2 11.7 9.7 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 54.4 39.2 29.0 22.1 17.3 13.9 11.4 9.5 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 52.7 37.8 28.0 21.3 16.7 13.4 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 50.4 36.1 26.7 20.3 16.0 12.9 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 47.4 33.8 25.0 19.0 15.0 12.1 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 43.2 30.7 22.5 17.2 13.5 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 36.9 25.9 18.9 14.4 11.4 9.4 7.9 6.9 6.0 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 26.3 17.9 12.8 9.8 7.9 6.7 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 5.2 1.9 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.3 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.7 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 15.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 5 YOS / E-5 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 16.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 5 YOS / E-5 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 55.1 40.9 31.1 24.2 19.2 15.5 12.7 10.6 9.0 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.95 54.7 40.6 30.9 24.0 19.0 15.4 12.6 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.90 54.2 40.3 30.6 23.8 18.9 15.3 12.6 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.85 53.7 39.9 30.3 23.5 18.7 15.1 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.80 53.1 39.4 30.0 23.3 18.5 15.0 12.3 10.3 8.7 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.75 52.5 38.9 29.6 23.0 18.3 14.8 12.2 10.2 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.70 51.7 38.3 29.1 22.7 18.0 14.6 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.65 50.8 37.7 28.6 22.3 17.7 14.4 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 49.8 36.9 28.0 21.8 17.4 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 48.6 36.0 27.3 21.3 17.0 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 47.1 34.9 26.5 20.7 16.5 13.4 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 45.3 33.5 25.5 19.9 15.9 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.8 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 43.1 31.9 24.2 18.9 15.2 12.4 10.4 8.8 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 40.3 29.7 22.6 17.7 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 36.5 26.8 20.4 16.0 12.9 10.7 9.1 7.8 6.8 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.25 31.1 22.8 17.3 13.7 11.1 9.4 8.0 7.0 6.2 5.5 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1
0.20 23.1 16.7 12.7 10.2 8.5 7.3 6.5 5.8 5.2 4.8 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 9.8 6.6 5.1 4.3 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 63.8 46.2 34.4 26.2 20.4 16.3 13.2 10.9 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.95 63.3 45.9 34.1 26.0 20.3 16.2 13.1 10.9 9.1 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.90 62.9 45.6 33.9 25.8 20.1 16.0 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.85 62.4 45.2 33.6 25.6 19.9 15.9 12.9 10.7 9.0 7.6 6.6 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.80 61.8 44.7 33.2 25.3 19.8 15.8 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.75 61.1 44.2 32.8 25.0 19.5 15.6 12.7 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.70 60.3 43.6 32.4 24.7 19.3 15.4 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.65 59.5 43.0 31.9 24.3 19.0 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.60 58.4 42.2 31.3 23.8 18.6 14.9 12.2 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 57.2 41.3 30.6 23.3 18.2 14.6 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 55.8 40.2 29.8 22.7 17.7 14.2 11.7 9.7 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 54.0 38.8 28.8 21.9 17.2 13.8 11.3 9.5 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 51.8 37.2 27.5 20.9 16.4 13.2 10.9 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 48.9 35.0 25.8 19.7 15.5 12.5 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.30 45.1 32.1 23.6 18.0 14.2 11.5 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.25 39.8 28.1 20.6 15.7 12.4 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.4 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2
0.20 31.8 22.0 16.0 12.2 9.7 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.4 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 18.5 11.9 8.3 6.4 5.3 4.7 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 17.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 6 YOS / E-5 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 18.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 6 YOS / E-5 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 56.7 42.1 32.0 24.8 19.7 15.9 13.0 10.9 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.95 56.3 41.8 31.8 24.7 19.5 15.8 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.90 55.8 41.4 31.5 24.5 19.4 15.7 12.9 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.85 55.2 41.0 31.2 24.2 19.2 15.5 12.8 10.6 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.80 54.6 40.6 30.8 24.0 19.0 15.4 12.6 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.75 54.0 40.1 30.4 23.7 18.8 15.2 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.70 53.2 39.5 30.0 23.3 18.5 15.0 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.65 52.3 38.8 29.5 22.9 18.2 14.8 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.60 51.3 38.0 28.9 22.5 17.9 14.5 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.55 50.0 37.1 28.2 21.9 17.5 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 48.5 36.0 27.3 21.3 17.0 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 46.7 34.6 26.3 20.5 16.4 13.3 11.1 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 44.5 32.9 25.0 19.5 15.6 12.8 10.6 9.0 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 41.6 30.7 23.3 18.2 14.6 12.0 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 37.7 27.7 21.1 16.5 13.3 11.0 9.3 8.0 6.9 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.25 32.2 23.6 17.9 14.1 11.5 9.6 8.2 7.2 6.3 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2
0.20 24.1 17.4 13.3 10.6 8.8 7.6 6.6 5.9 5.4 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 10.5 7.2 5.5 4.6 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 65.3 47.4 35.3 26.9 20.9 16.7 13.5 11.2 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.95 64.9 47.1 35.0 26.7 20.8 16.6 13.4 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.90 64.4 46.7 34.7 26.5 20.6 16.4 13.4 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.85 63.9 46.3 34.4 26.2 20.5 16.3 13.2 10.9 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.80 63.3 45.9 34.1 26.0 20.3 16.2 13.1 10.9 9.1 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.75 62.6 45.4 33.7 25.7 20.0 16.0 13.0 10.8 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.70 61.8 44.8 33.3 25.3 19.8 15.8 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.65 60.9 44.1 32.7 24.9 19.5 15.6 12.7 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.60 59.9 43.3 32.1 24.5 19.1 15.3 12.5 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.55 58.7 42.4 31.4 24.0 18.7 15.0 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.50 57.2 41.2 30.6 23.3 18.2 14.6 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 55.4 39.9 29.5 22.5 17.6 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 53.1 38.2 28.2 21.5 16.9 13.5 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.35 50.2 36.0 26.6 20.2 15.9 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 46.3 33.0 24.3 18.5 14.6 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.25 40.9 28.9 21.2 16.2 12.8 10.4 8.7 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.3 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 32.7 22.7 16.5 12.6 10.1 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 19.2 12.5 8.7 6.7 5.5 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9
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Figure 19.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 7 YOS / E-5 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 20.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 7 YOS / E-5 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 58.3 43.4 33.0 25.6 20.2 16.3 13.4 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.95 57.9 43.0 32.7 25.4 20.1 16.2 13.3 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.90 57.4 42.7 32.4 25.2 19.9 16.1 13.2 11.0 9.2 7.9 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.85 56.9 42.3 32.1 24.9 19.8 15.9 13.1 10.9 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.80 56.2 41.8 31.8 24.7 19.5 15.8 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.75 55.5 41.3 31.4 24.4 19.3 15.6 12.8 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.70 54.8 40.7 30.9 24.0 19.0 15.4 12.7 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.65 53.8 40.0 30.4 23.6 18.7 15.2 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.60 52.8 39.2 29.8 23.1 18.4 14.9 12.3 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.55 51.5 38.2 29.0 22.6 18.0 14.6 12.0 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.50 50.0 37.0 28.2 21.9 17.5 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 48.1 35.6 27.1 21.1 16.8 13.7 11.4 9.6 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 45.8 33.9 25.7 20.1 16.1 13.1 10.9 9.2 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.35 42.8 31.6 24.0 18.8 15.1 12.3 10.3 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 38.8 28.6 21.7 17.0 13.7 11.3 9.5 8.2 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 33.2 24.4 18.5 14.6 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.3 6.4 5.7 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 24.9 18.0 13.7 10.9 9.1 7.8 6.8 6.1 5.5 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 10.9 7.5 5.7 4.8 4.4 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.7 3.5 3.3 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.2 1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.3 0.6 0.7 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 67.0 48.7 36.2 27.6 21.5 17.1 13.9 11.4 9.5 8.1 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.95 66.5 48.3 36.0 27.4 21.4 17.0 13.8 11.3 9.5 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.90 66.0 48.0 35.7 27.2 21.2 16.9 13.7 11.3 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.85 65.5 47.6 35.4 27.0 21.0 16.7 13.6 11.2 9.4 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.80 64.9 47.1 35.0 26.7 20.8 16.6 13.4 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.75 64.2 46.6 34.6 26.4 20.6 16.4 13.3 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.70 63.4 46.0 34.2 26.0 20.3 16.2 13.2 10.9 9.1 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.65 62.5 45.3 33.6 25.6 20.0 16.0 13.0 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.60 61.4 44.4 33.0 25.2 19.6 15.7 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.55 60.1 43.5 32.3 24.6 19.2 15.4 12.5 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.50 58.6 42.3 31.4 23.9 18.7 15.0 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.45 56.7 40.9 30.3 23.1 18.1 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 54.4 39.2 29.0 22.1 17.3 13.9 11.4 9.5 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.35 51.4 36.9 27.3 20.8 16.3 13.1 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 47.5 33.9 25.0 19.1 15.0 12.1 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 41.9 29.7 21.8 16.6 13.1 10.7 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.8 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 33.5 23.3 17.0 13.0 10.3 8.5 7.3 6.4 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.15 19.6 12.8 9.0 6.8 5.7 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.6 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.8 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.9
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Figure 21.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 8 YOS / E-5 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 22.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 8 YOS / E-5 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 60.1 44.7 34.0 26.4 20.8 16.8 13.7 11.4 9.5 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.95 59.7 44.4 33.7 26.2 20.7 16.7 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.90 59.2 44.0 33.5 26.0 20.5 16.5 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.85 58.7 43.6 33.1 25.7 20.4 16.4 13.4 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.80 58.1 43.2 32.8 25.5 20.2 16.2 13.3 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.75 57.4 42.7 32.4 25.2 19.9 16.1 13.2 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.70 56.6 42.1 32.0 24.8 19.7 15.9 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.65 55.7 41.4 31.4 24.4 19.4 15.6 12.8 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.60 54.6 40.6 30.8 24.0 19.0 15.4 12.6 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.55 53.4 39.6 30.1 23.4 18.6 15.0 12.4 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.50 51.9 38.5 29.3 22.8 18.1 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.45 50.1 37.1 28.2 22.0 17.5 14.2 11.7 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 47.8 35.4 26.9 21.0 16.7 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.35 44.8 33.2 25.2 19.7 15.7 12.9 10.7 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.9 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.30 40.9 30.2 22.9 18.0 14.4 11.9 9.9 8.5 7.3 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 35.4 26.0 19.8 15.5 12.6 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 27.2 19.8 15.1 11.9 9.8 8.4 7.3 6.4 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 13.5 9.4 7.2 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.6 4.3 4.1 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.9 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 68.8 50.0 37.2 28.4 22.1 17.6 14.2 11.7 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.95 68.3 49.7 37.0 28.2 21.9 17.4 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.90 67.8 49.3 36.7 28.0 21.8 17.3 14.0 11.5 9.6 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.85 67.3 48.9 36.4 27.7 21.6 17.2 13.9 11.5 9.6 8.1 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.80 66.7 48.5 36.1 27.5 21.4 17.0 13.8 11.4 9.5 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.75 66.0 47.9 35.7 27.2 21.2 16.9 13.7 11.3 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.70 65.2 47.4 35.2 26.8 20.9 16.7 13.5 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.65 64.3 46.7 34.7 26.4 20.6 16.4 13.3 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.60 63.3 45.9 34.1 26.0 20.3 16.2 13.1 10.9 9.1 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.55 62.0 44.9 33.4 25.4 19.8 15.8 12.9 10.7 9.0 7.6 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.50 60.5 43.8 32.5 24.8 19.3 15.5 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.45 58.7 42.4 31.5 24.0 18.7 15.0 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.40 56.4 40.7 30.2 23.0 18.0 14.4 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.35 53.5 38.5 28.5 21.7 17.0 13.6 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.3
0.30 49.6 35.5 26.2 20.0 15.7 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.25 44.1 31.3 23.1 17.6 13.8 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.20 35.8 25.1 18.3 14.0 11.1 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.9 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1
0.15 22.1 14.7 10.4 8.0 6.5 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 1.1 1.6 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 23.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 9 YOS / E-5 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 24.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 9 YOS / E-5 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 62.1 46.2 35.1 27.2 21.5 17.3 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.95 61.6 45.9 34.8 27.0 21.3 17.1 14.0 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.90 61.1 45.5 34.6 26.8 21.2 17.0 13.9 11.5 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.85 60.6 45.1 34.3 26.6 21.0 16.9 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.80 60.0 44.6 33.9 26.3 20.8 16.7 13.7 11.3 9.5 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.75 59.3 44.1 33.5 26.0 20.6 16.6 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.70 58.5 43.5 33.1 25.7 20.3 16.4 13.4 11.1 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.65 57.6 42.8 32.5 25.3 20.0 16.1 13.2 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.60 56.6 42.0 31.9 24.8 19.6 15.9 13.0 10.8 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.55 55.3 41.1 31.2 24.2 19.2 15.5 12.8 10.6 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.50 53.8 40.0 30.4 23.6 18.7 15.2 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.45 52.0 38.6 29.3 22.8 18.1 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.40 49.7 36.9 28.0 21.8 17.4 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.35 46.8 34.6 26.3 20.5 16.4 13.4 11.1 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.30 42.9 31.7 24.1 18.8 15.1 12.4 10.3 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.25 37.4 27.5 20.9 16.4 13.2 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.9 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.20 29.2 21.3 16.2 12.8 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.7 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.3 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1
0.15 15.5 10.9 8.3 6.8 5.9 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.5 1.2 1.6 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 70.7 51.5 38.4 29.2 22.7 18.0 14.6 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.95 70.3 51.2 38.1 29.0 22.6 17.9 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.90 69.8 50.8 37.8 28.8 22.4 17.8 14.4 11.8 9.9 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.85 69.3 50.4 37.5 28.6 22.2 17.7 14.3 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.0 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.80 68.7 49.9 37.2 28.3 22.0 17.5 14.2 11.7 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.75 68.0 49.4 36.8 28.0 21.8 17.3 14.0 11.6 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.70 67.2 48.8 36.3 27.7 21.6 17.1 13.9 11.4 9.6 8.1 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.65 66.3 48.1 35.8 27.3 21.3 16.9 13.7 11.3 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.60 65.3 47.4 35.2 26.8 20.9 16.6 13.5 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.55 64.0 46.4 34.5 26.3 20.5 16.3 13.3 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.50 62.5 45.3 33.6 25.6 20.0 15.9 13.0 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.45 60.7 43.9 32.6 24.8 19.4 15.5 12.6 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.40 58.4 42.2 31.3 23.8 18.6 14.9 12.2 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.35 55.5 39.9 29.6 22.5 17.6 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.30 51.6 37.0 27.3 20.8 16.3 13.1 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.25 46.1 32.8 24.2 18.4 14.5 11.7 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.20 37.9 26.6 19.5 14.8 11.8 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.1 5.4 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1
0.15 24.2 16.3 11.6 8.8 7.2 6.1 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.8 1.4 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
E-5  /  9 YOS  /  female
personal discount rate (annual)
p
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
re
ac
h
in
g 
re
ti
re
m
en
t 
el
ig
ib
ili
ty
 (
>
2
0
 Y
O
S)
70 
 
 
Figure 25.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 10 YOS / E-6 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 26.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 10 YOS / E-6 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 63.9 47.6 36.1 28.0 22.1 17.7 14.5 11.9 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.95 63.5 47.3 35.9 27.8 22.0 17.6 14.4 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.90 63.0 46.9 35.6 27.6 21.8 17.5 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.85 62.5 46.5 35.3 27.4 21.6 17.4 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.80 61.9 46.0 35.0 27.1 21.4 17.2 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.3 7.0 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.75 61.2 45.5 34.6 26.8 21.2 17.0 13.9 11.5 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.70 60.4 44.9 34.1 26.5 20.9 16.8 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.65 59.5 44.3 33.6 26.1 20.6 16.6 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.60 58.5 43.5 33.0 25.6 20.3 16.3 13.4 11.1 9.4 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.55 57.2 42.5 32.3 25.1 19.9 16.0 13.1 10.9 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.50 55.8 41.4 31.5 24.4 19.4 15.7 12.9 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.45 54.0 40.1 30.4 23.7 18.8 15.2 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.40 51.7 38.3 29.1 22.7 18.0 14.6 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3
0.35 48.8 36.1 27.5 21.4 17.1 13.9 11.5 9.7 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.30 44.9 33.2 25.2 19.7 15.8 12.9 10.7 9.1 7.8 6.7 5.9 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.25 39.5 29.1 22.1 17.3 14.0 11.5 9.7 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.5 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.20 31.4 23.0 17.5 13.8 11.2 9.4 8.1 7.0 6.2 5.5 4.9 4.4 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2
0.15 17.8 12.7 9.7 7.8 6.7 6.0 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.3 4.0 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.9 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 72.5 52.9 39.4 30.0 23.4 18.5 14.9 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.95 72.1 52.5 39.2 29.8 23.2 18.4 14.9 12.2 10.1 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.90 71.6 52.2 38.9 29.6 23.1 18.3 14.8 12.1 10.1 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.85 71.1 51.8 38.6 29.4 22.9 18.2 14.7 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.80 70.5 51.3 38.2 29.1 22.7 18.0 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.75 69.8 50.8 37.9 28.8 22.4 17.8 14.4 11.8 9.9 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.70 69.0 50.2 37.4 28.5 22.2 17.6 14.3 11.7 9.8 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.65 68.1 49.6 36.9 28.1 21.9 17.4 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.60 67.1 48.8 36.3 27.7 21.5 17.1 13.9 11.4 9.5 8.1 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.55 65.9 47.8 35.6 27.1 21.1 16.8 13.6 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.50 64.4 46.7 34.7 26.5 20.6 16.4 13.4 11.0 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.45 62.6 45.3 33.7 25.7 20.0 16.0 13.0 10.8 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.40 60.3 43.6 32.4 24.7 19.3 15.4 12.6 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4
0.35 57.4 41.4 30.7 23.4 18.3 14.7 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.30 53.6 38.5 28.5 21.7 17.0 13.7 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.25 48.1 34.4 25.4 19.4 15.2 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.4 5.6 4.9 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2
0.20 40.0 28.3 20.7 15.8 12.5 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.4 5.6 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2
0.15 26.5 18.0 12.9 9.9 8.0 6.7 5.9 5.3 4.8 4.4 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.2 2.9 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0
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Figure 27.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 11 YOS / E-6 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 28.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 11 YOS / E-6 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 65.9 49.1 37.3 28.9 22.8 18.3 14.9 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.95 65.5 48.8 37.1 28.7 22.6 18.1 14.8 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.90 65.0 48.5 36.8 28.5 22.5 18.0 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.85 64.5 48.1 36.5 28.3 22.3 17.9 14.6 12.0 10.1 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.80 63.9 47.6 36.2 28.0 22.1 17.7 14.5 11.9 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.75 63.3 47.1 35.8 27.7 21.9 17.6 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.70 62.5 46.5 35.4 27.4 21.6 17.4 14.2 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.65 61.6 45.9 34.9 27.0 21.3 17.2 14.0 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.60 60.6 45.1 34.3 26.6 21.0 16.9 13.8 11.4 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.55 59.4 44.2 33.6 26.0 20.6 16.6 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.50 57.9 43.1 32.7 25.4 20.1 16.2 13.3 11.0 9.3 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.45 56.2 41.7 31.7 24.6 19.5 15.8 12.9 10.8 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.8 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.40 53.9 40.0 30.4 23.7 18.8 15.2 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.5 5.6 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.35 51.1 37.9 28.8 22.4 17.8 14.5 11.9 10.0 8.5 7.3 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.30 47.3 35.0 26.6 20.7 16.5 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.25 41.9 31.0 23.5 18.4 14.8 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.5 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.20 34.0 24.9 18.9 14.9 12.1 10.1 8.6 7.4 6.5 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.15 20.6 14.8 11.3 9.1 7.6 6.7 6.0 5.4 5.0 4.5 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.2 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.7 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 74.6 54.4 40.6 30.9 24.0 19.0 15.3 12.6 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.95 74.1 54.1 40.3 30.7 23.9 18.9 15.3 12.5 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.90 73.7 53.7 40.1 30.5 23.7 18.8 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.85 73.1 53.3 39.8 30.3 23.6 18.7 15.1 12.3 10.3 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.80 72.6 52.9 39.4 30.0 23.4 18.5 15.0 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.75 71.9 52.4 39.1 29.8 23.1 18.4 14.8 12.2 10.1 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.70 71.1 51.8 38.6 29.4 22.9 18.2 14.7 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.2 6.2 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.65 70.3 51.2 38.1 29.0 22.6 17.9 14.5 11.9 9.9 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.4
0.60 69.2 50.4 37.5 28.6 22.3 17.7 14.3 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.0 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.55 68.0 49.5 36.8 28.1 21.8 17.4 14.1 11.6 9.7 8.2 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.50 66.6 48.4 36.0 27.4 21.4 17.0 13.8 11.4 9.5 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.45 64.8 47.0 35.0 26.6 20.8 16.5 13.4 11.1 9.3 7.9 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.40 62.6 45.3 33.7 25.7 20.0 16.0 13.0 10.7 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.35 59.7 43.2 32.0 24.4 19.1 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.30 55.9 40.3 29.9 22.8 17.8 14.3 11.7 9.7 8.2 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.7 4.1 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.25 50.6 36.3 26.8 20.4 16.0 12.9 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3
0.20 42.6 30.2 22.2 16.9 13.4 10.9 9.1 7.7 6.7 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2
0.15 29.3 20.1 14.5 11.1 8.9 7.5 6.5 5.7 5.2 4.7 4.3 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.0
0.10 2.6 -- -- -- -- 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 29.  Enlisted Policy Chart:12 YOS / E-6 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 30.  Enlisted Policy Chart: 12 YOS / E-6 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 68.3 50.9 38.7 29.9 23.6 18.9 15.3 12.6 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.95 67.9 50.6 38.4 29.7 23.4 18.7 15.2 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.90 67.4 50.2 38.2 29.5 23.3 18.6 15.1 12.5 10.4 8.8 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.85 66.9 49.9 37.9 29.3 23.1 18.5 15.0 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.80 66.4 49.4 37.6 29.1 22.9 18.4 14.9 12.3 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.75 65.7 49.0 37.2 28.8 22.7 18.2 14.8 12.2 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.70 65.0 48.4 36.8 28.5 22.5 18.0 14.7 12.1 10.1 8.5 7.3 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.65 64.2 47.8 36.3 28.1 22.2 17.8 14.5 12.0 10.0 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.60 63.2 47.0 35.7 27.7 21.9 17.6 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.55 62.0 46.2 35.1 27.2 21.5 17.3 14.1 11.7 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.50 60.6 45.1 34.3 26.6 21.0 16.9 13.8 11.5 9.6 8.1 7.0 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.45 58.9 43.8 33.3 25.8 20.4 16.5 13.5 11.2 9.4 8.0 6.9 5.9 5.1 4.5 3.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.40 56.8 42.2 32.1 24.9 19.7 15.9 13.1 10.9 9.2 7.8 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.35 54.1 40.2 30.5 23.7 18.8 15.2 12.5 10.5 8.8 7.6 6.5 5.7 4.9 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.30 50.5 37.4 28.4 22.1 17.6 14.3 11.8 9.9 8.4 7.2 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.25 45.4 33.6 25.5 19.9 15.9 13.0 10.8 9.2 7.8 6.8 5.9 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.20 37.8 27.8 21.1 16.6 13.4 11.1 9.3 8.0 7.0 6.1 5.4 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.15 25.1 18.2 13.8 11.0 9.1 7.8 6.8 6.1 5.5 5.0 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.10 -- -- -- -- 0.7 1.3 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 76.9 56.2 41.9 31.9 24.8 19.6 15.8 12.9 10.7 9.0 7.6 6.5 5.6 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.95 76.5 55.9 41.7 31.8 24.7 19.5 15.7 12.9 10.6 8.9 7.6 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.90 76.1 55.5 41.4 31.6 24.5 19.4 15.6 12.8 10.6 8.9 7.5 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.85 75.6 55.2 41.2 31.3 24.4 19.3 15.5 12.7 10.5 8.8 7.5 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.80 75.0 54.7 40.8 31.1 24.2 19.2 15.4 12.6 10.5 8.8 7.4 6.4 5.5 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.75 74.4 54.3 40.5 30.8 24.0 19.0 15.3 12.5 10.4 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.70 73.6 53.7 40.0 30.5 23.7 18.8 15.2 12.4 10.3 8.7 7.4 6.3 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.65 72.8 53.1 39.6 30.1 23.4 18.6 15.0 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.3 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5
0.60 71.8 52.3 39.0 29.7 23.1 18.3 14.8 12.1 10.1 8.5 7.2 6.2 5.4 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.55 70.7 51.5 38.3 29.2 22.7 18.0 14.6 12.0 10.0 8.4 7.1 6.1 5.3 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5
0.50 69.3 50.4 37.5 28.6 22.3 17.7 14.3 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.0 6.1 5.2 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.45 67.6 49.1 36.6 27.9 21.7 17.3 14.0 11.5 9.6 8.1 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.5 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4
0.40 65.5 47.5 35.4 26.9 21.0 16.7 13.6 11.2 9.4 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.35 62.8 45.5 33.8 25.7 20.1 16.0 13.0 10.8 9.0 7.7 6.6 5.7 5.0 4.4 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4
0.30 59.1 42.7 31.7 24.2 18.9 15.1 12.3 10.2 8.6 7.4 6.3 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.25 54.0 38.9 28.8 21.9 17.2 13.8 11.3 9.5 8.0 6.9 6.0 5.2 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3
0.20 46.4 33.1 24.4 18.6 14.6 11.8 9.8 8.3 7.1 6.2 5.5 4.8 4.3 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2
0.15 33.7 23.5 17.1 13.0 10.4 8.6 7.3 6.4 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1
0.10 8.3 4.3 2.5 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.1
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Appendix B: Officer Policy Tables 
 
 
Figure 31.  Officer Policy Chart: 0 YOS / O-1 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 32.  Officer Policy Chart: 0 YOS / O-1 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 59.9 42.9 31.3 23.3 17.8 13.8 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 59.4 42.5 31.0 23.1 17.6 13.7 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 58.8 42.0 30.6 22.8 17.4 13.5 10.7 8.7 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.85 58.2 41.5 30.2 22.5 17.1 13.3 10.6 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 57.5 41.0 29.8 22.1 16.8 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.75 56.7 40.3 29.3 21.7 16.5 12.8 10.2 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.70 55.8 39.6 28.7 21.3 16.2 12.5 10.0 8.1 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.65 54.7 38.8 28.1 20.8 15.7 12.2 9.7 7.9 6.5 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 53.5 37.8 27.3 20.2 15.3 11.8 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 52.0 36.6 26.4 19.4 14.7 11.4 9.0 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.50 50.2 35.2 25.3 18.6 14.0 10.8 8.6 7.0 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 48.1 33.5 23.9 17.5 13.2 10.2 8.1 6.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.40 45.4 31.4 22.3 16.2 12.1 9.3 7.4 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 41.9 28.7 20.1 14.5 10.8 8.3 6.5 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 37.3 25.1 17.3 12.2 9.0 6.8 5.4 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
0.25 30.9 20.0 13.2 9.0 6.4 4.8 3.8 3.2 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 21.2 12.4 7.2 4.3 2.7 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.15 5.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.2
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 63.2 44.9 32.5 24.1 18.2 14.1 11.2 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 62.6 44.5 32.2 23.8 18.0 14.0 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 62.1 44.0 31.9 23.6 17.8 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.85 61.4 43.5 31.5 23.3 17.6 13.6 10.7 8.7 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 60.7 43.0 31.0 22.9 17.3 13.4 10.6 8.5 7.0 5.8 5.0 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.75 59.9 42.3 30.5 22.5 17.0 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.70 59.0 41.6 29.9 22.1 16.6 12.8 10.1 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.65 57.9 40.8 29.3 21.5 16.2 12.5 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 56.7 39.8 28.5 20.9 15.7 12.1 9.6 7.7 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 55.2 38.6 27.6 20.2 15.2 11.7 9.2 7.4 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.50 53.5 37.2 26.5 19.3 14.5 11.1 8.8 7.1 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 51.3 35.5 25.2 18.3 13.6 10.5 8.2 6.7 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.40 48.6 33.4 23.5 16.9 12.6 9.6 7.6 6.1 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 45.2 30.7 21.3 15.2 11.2 8.6 6.7 5.5 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 40.6 27.1 18.5 13.0 9.4 7.1 5.6 4.6 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
0.25 34.1 22.0 14.5 9.8 6.9 5.1 4.0 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 24.4 14.3 8.4 5.0 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.15 8.3 1.6 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.2
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 33.  Officer Policy Chart: 1 YOS / O-1 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 34.  Officer Policy Chart: 1 YOS / O-1 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 59.7 42.7 31.1 23.2 17.7 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 59.1 42.3 30.8 22.9 17.5 13.6 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 58.5 41.8 30.4 22.7 17.2 13.4 10.6 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.85 57.9 41.3 30.0 22.3 17.0 13.2 10.5 8.5 7.0 5.8 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 57.1 40.7 29.6 22.0 16.7 13.0 10.3 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7
0.75 56.3 40.0 29.0 21.5 16.4 12.7 10.1 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.70 55.3 39.2 28.4 21.1 16.0 12.4 9.8 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.65 54.2 38.4 27.7 20.5 15.5 12.1 9.6 7.8 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 52.9 37.3 26.9 19.9 15.0 11.6 9.2 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 51.3 36.1 26.0 19.1 14.4 11.2 8.9 7.2 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.50 49.5 34.7 24.8 18.2 13.7 10.6 8.4 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 47.2 32.9 23.4 17.1 12.8 9.9 7.8 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.40 44.4 30.7 21.7 15.7 11.7 9.0 7.2 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
0.35 40.8 27.8 19.4 13.9 10.3 7.9 6.3 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.30 35.9 24.0 16.4 11.5 8.4 6.4 5.1 4.2 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
0.25 29.1 18.6 12.2 8.2 5.8 4.3 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.20 18.9 10.6 5.8 3.2 1.8 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0
0.15 2.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 62.9 44.7 32.4 24.0 18.1 14.0 11.1 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 62.4 44.2 32.0 23.7 17.9 13.9 11.0 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 61.8 43.8 31.7 23.4 17.7 13.7 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.85 61.1 43.2 31.3 23.1 17.4 13.5 10.7 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 60.4 42.7 30.8 22.7 17.2 13.3 10.5 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7
0.75 59.5 42.0 30.3 22.3 16.8 13.0 10.3 8.3 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.70 58.5 41.2 29.7 21.8 16.4 12.7 10.0 8.1 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.65 57.4 40.3 29.0 21.3 16.0 12.3 9.8 7.9 6.5 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 56.1 39.3 28.2 20.6 15.5 11.9 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 54.6 38.1 27.2 19.9 14.9 11.5 9.0 7.3 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.50 52.7 36.6 26.0 19.0 14.2 10.9 8.6 6.9 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 50.5 34.9 24.6 17.9 13.3 10.2 8.0 6.5 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.40 47.6 32.6 22.9 16.5 12.2 9.3 7.3 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
0.35 44.0 29.8 20.6 14.7 10.8 8.2 6.4 5.2 4.4 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.30 39.1 26.0 17.6 12.3 8.9 6.7 5.2 4.3 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4
0.25 32.4 20.6 13.4 9.0 6.2 4.6 3.6 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.20 22.2 12.6 7.1 4.0 2.3 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0
0.15 5.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 35.  Officer Policy Chart: 2 YOS / O-2 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 36.  Officer Policy Chart: 2 YOS / O-2 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 59.4 42.5 31.0 23.1 17.6 13.7 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 58.9 42.0 30.6 22.8 17.4 13.5 10.7 8.7 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.90 58.2 41.6 30.3 22.5 17.1 13.3 10.6 8.6 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.85 57.6 41.0 29.8 22.2 16.9 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 56.8 40.4 29.3 21.8 16.5 12.9 10.2 8.3 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.75 55.9 39.7 28.8 21.3 16.2 12.6 10.0 8.1 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.70 54.9 38.9 28.2 20.8 15.8 12.3 9.7 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.65 53.7 38.0 27.4 20.3 15.3 11.9 9.4 7.7 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 52.3 36.9 26.6 19.6 14.8 11.5 9.1 7.4 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.55 50.7 35.6 25.6 18.8 14.2 11.0 8.7 7.1 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.50 48.7 34.1 24.4 17.8 13.4 10.4 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 46.4 32.2 22.9 16.7 12.5 9.6 7.6 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.40 43.4 29.9 21.0 15.2 11.3 8.7 6.9 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.35 39.6 26.9 18.7 13.3 9.9 7.5 6.0 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.30 34.5 22.9 15.5 10.8 7.9 6.0 4.7 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3
0.25 27.4 17.2 11.1 7.3 5.1 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.20 16.7 8.8 4.4 2.1 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
0.15 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.7
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 62.7 44.5 32.2 23.9 18.1 14.0 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 62.1 44.0 31.9 23.6 17.8 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.90 61.5 43.5 31.5 23.3 17.6 13.6 10.8 8.7 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.85 60.8 43.0 31.1 22.9 17.3 13.4 10.6 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 60.0 42.4 30.6 22.5 17.0 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.75 59.1 41.7 30.0 22.1 16.7 12.9 10.2 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.70 58.1 40.9 29.4 21.6 16.3 12.6 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.65 56.9 39.9 28.6 21.0 15.8 12.2 9.6 7.8 6.4 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 55.5 38.9 27.8 20.4 15.3 11.8 9.3 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.55 53.9 37.6 26.8 19.6 14.6 11.3 8.9 7.2 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.50 52.0 36.1 25.6 18.6 13.9 10.7 8.4 6.8 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 49.6 34.2 24.1 17.4 13.0 9.9 7.8 6.3 5.3 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.40 46.6 31.9 22.3 16.0 11.8 9.0 7.1 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.35 42.8 28.8 19.9 14.1 10.3 7.8 6.1 5.0 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.30 37.7 24.8 16.7 11.6 8.3 6.3 4.9 4.0 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3
0.25 30.6 19.2 12.3 8.1 5.6 4.0 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.20 19.9 10.8 5.7 2.8 1.4 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0
0.15 2.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 37.  Officer Policy Chart: 3 YOS / O-2 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 38.  Officer Policy Chart: 3 YOS / O-2 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 60.4 43.3 31.6 23.6 18.0 14.0 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 59.9 42.9 31.3 23.3 17.8 13.8 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 59.3 42.4 30.9 23.0 17.5 13.6 10.8 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.85 58.6 41.9 30.5 22.7 17.3 13.4 10.7 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 57.9 41.3 30.0 22.3 17.0 13.2 10.5 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.75 57.1 40.6 29.5 21.9 16.7 12.9 10.3 8.3 6.9 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7
0.70 56.1 39.9 28.9 21.5 16.3 12.6 10.0 8.1 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.65 55.0 39.0 28.2 20.9 15.9 12.3 9.8 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 53.7 38.0 27.4 20.3 15.4 11.9 9.4 7.7 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 52.2 36.8 26.5 19.5 14.8 11.4 9.1 7.4 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.50 50.3 35.3 25.3 18.6 14.0 10.9 8.6 7.0 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 48.1 33.6 23.9 17.5 13.2 10.2 8.1 6.6 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.40 45.3 31.4 22.2 16.1 12.1 9.3 7.4 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 41.7 28.5 20.0 14.4 10.7 8.2 6.5 5.3 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 36.9 24.7 17.0 12.0 8.8 6.7 5.3 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
0.25 30.1 19.4 12.8 8.7 6.2 4.6 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.20 20.0 11.5 6.5 3.7 2.2 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1
0.15 3.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 63.7 45.3 32.8 24.3 18.4 14.3 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.95 63.1 44.8 32.5 24.1 18.2 14.1 11.2 9.0 7.4 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 62.5 44.4 32.1 23.8 18.0 13.9 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.85 61.9 43.9 31.7 23.5 17.8 13.7 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.80 61.1 43.3 31.3 23.1 17.5 13.5 10.7 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.75 60.3 42.6 30.7 22.7 17.1 13.2 10.5 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7
0.70 59.3 41.9 30.2 22.2 16.8 12.9 10.2 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.65 58.2 41.0 29.5 21.7 16.3 12.6 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.60 56.9 40.0 28.7 21.0 15.8 12.2 9.6 7.8 6.4 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 55.4 38.8 27.7 20.3 15.2 11.7 9.3 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.50 53.6 37.3 26.6 19.4 14.5 11.2 8.8 7.1 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 51.3 35.5 25.2 18.3 13.6 10.5 8.2 6.7 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.40 48.5 33.3 23.4 16.9 12.5 9.6 7.6 6.1 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 44.9 30.5 21.2 15.1 11.1 8.5 6.7 5.4 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 40.1 26.7 18.2 12.8 9.3 7.0 5.5 4.5 3.8 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4
0.25 33.4 21.4 14.0 9.5 6.6 4.9 3.8 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.20 23.3 13.5 7.7 4.5 2.7 1.8 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.15 6.5 0.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 39.  Officer Policy Chart: 4 YOS / O-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 40.  Officer Policy Chart: 4 YOS / O-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 61.8 44.3 32.4 24.2 18.5 14.4 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.95 61.2 43.9 32.1 24.0 18.3 14.2 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 60.6 43.4 31.7 23.7 18.0 14.0 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.85 60.0 42.9 31.3 23.4 17.8 13.8 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.80 59.2 42.3 30.9 23.0 17.5 13.6 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.75 58.4 41.7 30.3 22.6 17.2 13.3 10.6 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.70 57.4 40.9 29.7 22.1 16.8 13.0 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.7
0.65 56.3 40.0 29.0 21.5 16.4 12.7 10.1 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.60 55.0 39.0 28.2 20.9 15.8 12.3 9.8 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 53.5 37.8 27.3 20.1 15.2 11.8 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.50 51.6 36.3 26.1 19.2 14.5 11.2 8.9 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 49.3 34.5 24.7 18.1 13.6 10.5 8.4 6.8 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.40 46.5 32.3 23.0 16.7 12.5 9.7 7.7 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 42.9 29.5 20.7 15.0 11.1 8.5 6.8 5.5 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 38.1 25.7 17.7 12.6 9.2 7.0 5.6 4.6 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.25 31.3 20.3 13.5 9.2 6.6 5.0 3.9 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 21.1 12.3 7.2 4.3 2.6 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.15 4.2 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 65.0 46.3 33.7 25.0 19.0 14.7 11.6 9.4 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.95 64.5 45.9 33.3 24.7 18.7 14.5 11.5 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.90 63.9 45.4 33.0 24.4 18.5 14.3 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.85 63.2 44.9 32.6 24.1 18.3 14.1 11.2 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.80 62.5 44.3 32.1 23.7 18.0 13.9 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.75 61.6 43.6 31.6 23.3 17.6 13.6 10.8 8.7 7.1 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.70 60.7 42.9 31.0 22.9 17.3 13.3 10.5 8.5 7.0 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.65 59.5 42.0 30.3 22.3 16.8 13.0 10.3 8.3 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.60 58.2 41.0 29.5 21.7 16.3 12.6 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.55 56.7 39.8 28.5 20.9 15.7 12.1 9.6 7.7 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.50 54.8 38.3 27.3 20.0 15.0 11.5 9.1 7.4 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.45 52.6 36.5 25.9 18.9 14.1 10.8 8.5 6.9 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.40 49.8 34.3 24.2 17.5 13.0 10.0 7.9 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.35 46.1 31.4 21.9 15.7 11.6 8.8 7.0 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.30 41.3 27.6 18.9 13.3 9.7 7.3 5.8 4.7 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.25 34.5 22.3 14.7 10.0 7.1 5.2 4.1 3.4 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 24.4 14.3 8.4 5.0 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.15 7.4 1.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 41.  Officer Policy Chart: 5 YOS / O-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 42.  Officer Policy Chart: 5 YOS / O-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 63.1 45.4 33.3 24.9 19.0 14.8 11.8 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.95 62.6 45.0 33.0 24.7 18.8 14.7 11.6 9.4 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.90 62.0 44.5 32.6 24.4 18.6 14.5 11.5 9.3 7.6 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.85 61.4 44.0 32.2 24.0 18.3 14.3 11.3 9.2 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.80 60.6 43.4 31.7 23.7 18.0 14.0 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.75 59.8 42.8 31.2 23.3 17.7 13.8 10.9 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.70 58.8 42.0 30.6 22.8 17.3 13.5 10.7 8.7 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.65 57.7 41.1 29.9 22.2 16.9 13.1 10.4 8.4 7.0 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.60 56.4 40.1 29.1 21.6 16.4 12.7 10.1 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.55 54.9 38.9 28.2 20.9 15.8 12.3 9.7 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.50 53.0 37.5 27.0 20.0 15.1 11.7 9.3 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.45 50.8 35.7 25.6 18.9 14.2 11.0 8.7 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.40 48.0 33.5 23.9 17.5 13.1 10.1 8.0 6.5 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.35 44.4 30.6 21.6 15.7 11.7 9.0 7.1 5.8 4.9 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
0.30 39.6 26.9 18.7 13.3 9.8 7.5 6.0 4.9 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.25 32.8 21.6 14.5 10.0 7.2 5.4 4.3 3.6 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 22.7 13.6 8.2 5.1 3.3 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
0.15 5.9 0.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.2
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 66.4 47.4 34.5 25.7 19.5 15.1 12.0 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.95 65.8 47.0 34.2 25.4 19.3 15.0 11.8 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.90 65.3 46.5 33.8 25.1 19.1 14.8 11.7 9.4 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.85 64.6 46.0 33.4 24.8 18.8 14.6 11.5 9.3 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.80 63.9 45.4 33.0 24.4 18.5 14.3 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.75 63.0 44.7 32.4 24.0 18.2 14.1 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.70 62.1 44.0 31.8 23.5 17.8 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.65 60.9 43.1 31.1 23.0 17.4 13.4 10.6 8.6 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.60 59.6 42.1 30.3 22.4 16.9 13.0 10.3 8.3 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.55 58.1 40.9 29.4 21.6 16.3 12.6 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.50 56.3 39.4 28.2 20.7 15.6 12.0 9.5 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.45 54.0 37.7 26.9 19.6 14.7 11.3 8.9 7.2 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.40 51.2 35.5 25.1 18.2 13.6 10.4 8.2 6.6 5.5 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6
0.35 47.6 32.6 22.9 16.5 12.2 9.3 7.3 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
0.30 42.8 28.8 19.9 14.1 10.3 7.8 6.1 5.0 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.25 36.1 23.5 15.7 10.8 7.7 5.7 4.5 3.7 3.1 2.7 2.5 2.2 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.20 26.0 15.6 9.4 5.8 3.8 2.6 2.0 1.7 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1
0.15 9.2 2.3 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.2
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 43.  Officer Policy Chart: 6 YOS / O-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 44.  Officer Policy Chart: 6 YOS / O-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 64.6 46.6 34.2 25.7 19.6 15.3 12.1 9.8 8.1 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.95 64.1 46.2 33.9 25.4 19.4 15.1 12.0 9.7 8.0 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.90 63.6 45.7 33.6 25.1 19.2 15.0 11.9 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.85 62.9 45.2 33.2 24.8 18.9 14.8 11.7 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.80 62.2 44.7 32.7 24.5 18.7 14.5 11.5 9.3 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.75 61.4 44.0 32.2 24.1 18.3 14.3 11.3 9.2 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.70 60.4 43.3 31.6 23.6 18.0 14.0 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.65 59.4 42.4 31.0 23.1 17.6 13.7 10.8 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.60 58.1 41.4 30.2 22.4 17.1 13.3 10.5 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.55 56.6 40.3 29.3 21.7 16.5 12.8 10.2 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.50 54.8 38.9 28.1 20.8 15.8 12.3 9.7 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.45 52.7 37.2 26.8 19.8 15.0 11.6 9.2 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.40 49.9 35.0 25.1 18.4 13.9 10.7 8.5 6.9 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.35 46.4 32.3 22.9 16.7 12.5 9.7 7.7 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.30 41.8 28.6 20.0 14.4 10.7 8.2 6.5 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.25 35.2 23.4 16.0 11.2 8.2 6.2 4.9 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
0.20 25.4 15.7 9.9 6.4 4.3 3.2 2.5 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
0.15 9.1 2.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.8
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.2
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 67.9 48.6 35.5 26.4 20.1 15.6 12.3 9.9 8.1 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.95 67.4 48.2 35.1 26.2 19.9 15.4 12.2 9.8 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.90 66.8 47.7 34.8 25.9 19.7 15.3 12.1 9.7 8.0 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.85 66.1 47.2 34.4 25.6 19.4 15.1 11.9 9.6 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.80 65.4 46.7 33.9 25.2 19.1 14.8 11.7 9.4 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.75 64.6 46.0 33.4 24.8 18.8 14.6 11.5 9.3 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.70 63.7 45.3 32.9 24.4 18.5 14.3 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.65 62.6 44.4 32.2 23.8 18.0 14.0 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.60 61.3 43.4 31.4 23.2 17.5 13.6 10.7 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.55 59.9 42.3 30.5 22.5 17.0 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.50 58.1 40.9 29.4 21.6 16.3 12.6 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.45 55.9 39.1 28.0 20.5 15.4 11.9 9.4 7.6 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.40 53.2 37.0 26.3 19.2 14.4 11.0 8.7 7.0 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.35 49.7 34.2 24.1 17.5 13.0 10.0 7.8 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.30 45.0 30.6 21.2 15.2 11.2 8.5 6.7 5.4 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.25 38.5 25.4 17.2 12.0 8.6 6.5 5.1 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
0.20 28.7 17.7 11.1 7.1 4.8 3.4 2.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2
0.15 12.3 4.8 0.9 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.2
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 45.  Officer Policy Chart: 7 YOS / O-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 46.  Officer Policy Chart: 7 YOS / O-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 66.3 47.9 35.3 26.5 20.3 15.8 12.6 10.1 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.95 65.8 47.5 35.0 26.2 20.1 15.7 12.4 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.90 65.3 47.1 34.6 26.0 19.9 15.5 12.3 9.9 8.1 6.8 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.85 64.7 46.6 34.2 25.7 19.6 15.3 12.1 9.8 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.80 64.0 46.1 33.8 25.3 19.3 15.1 12.0 9.7 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.75 63.2 45.4 33.3 24.9 19.0 14.8 11.8 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.70 62.3 44.7 32.8 24.5 18.7 14.6 11.6 9.3 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.65 61.3 43.9 32.1 24.0 18.3 14.2 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.60 60.1 43.0 31.4 23.4 17.8 13.9 11.0 8.9 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.55 58.6 41.8 30.5 22.7 17.3 13.4 10.6 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.50 56.9 40.5 29.4 21.8 16.6 12.9 10.2 8.3 6.8 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.45 54.8 38.8 28.1 20.8 15.8 12.2 9.7 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.40 52.2 36.8 26.5 19.5 14.8 11.4 9.1 7.4 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.35 48.8 34.1 24.4 17.9 13.4 10.4 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.30 44.3 30.6 21.6 15.7 11.7 9.0 7.1 5.8 4.9 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
0.25 38.1 25.7 17.7 12.6 9.2 7.0 5.6 4.6 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.20 28.6 18.2 11.8 7.9 5.6 4.1 3.3 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.15 12.9 5.9 2.1 0.2 -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 69.6 49.9 36.5 27.2 20.7 16.1 12.7 10.3 8.4 7.0 5.8 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.95 69.1 49.5 36.2 27.0 20.5 15.9 12.6 10.2 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.90 68.5 49.1 35.9 26.7 20.3 15.8 12.5 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.85 67.9 48.6 35.5 26.4 20.1 15.6 12.3 9.9 8.1 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.80 67.2 48.1 35.0 26.1 19.8 15.4 12.2 9.8 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.75 66.4 47.4 34.6 25.7 19.5 15.1 12.0 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.70 65.5 46.7 34.0 25.3 19.2 14.8 11.7 9.5 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.65 64.5 45.9 33.4 24.7 18.8 14.5 11.5 9.3 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.60 63.3 45.0 32.6 24.1 18.3 14.2 11.2 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.55 61.9 43.8 31.7 23.4 17.7 13.7 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.50 60.2 42.5 30.6 22.6 17.1 13.2 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.45 58.1 40.8 29.3 21.6 16.2 12.5 9.9 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.40 55.4 38.8 27.7 20.3 15.2 11.7 9.2 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8 1.7
0.35 52.1 36.1 25.6 18.6 13.9 10.7 8.4 6.8 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.30 47.6 32.6 22.8 16.4 12.2 9.3 7.3 5.9 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5
0.25 41.3 27.6 18.9 13.3 9.7 7.3 5.8 4.7 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.20 31.9 20.2 13.1 8.7 6.0 4.4 3.4 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.15 16.2 7.8 3.3 1.0 -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.2 0.3
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
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Figure 47.  Officer Policy Chart: 8 YOS / O-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 48.  Officer Policy Chart: 8 YOS / O-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 67.8 49.1 36.2 27.2 20.9 16.3 12.9 10.4 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.95 67.4 48.7 35.9 27.0 20.7 16.1 12.8 10.3 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.90 66.8 48.3 35.6 26.7 20.5 16.0 12.7 10.2 8.4 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.85 66.2 47.8 35.2 26.4 20.2 15.8 12.5 10.1 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.80 65.6 47.3 34.8 26.1 20.0 15.6 12.4 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.75 64.8 46.7 34.3 25.7 19.7 15.3 12.2 9.8 8.1 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.70 63.9 46.0 33.8 25.3 19.3 15.1 12.0 9.7 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.65 62.9 45.2 33.2 24.8 19.0 14.8 11.7 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.60 61.8 44.3 32.4 24.2 18.5 14.4 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.55 60.4 43.2 31.6 23.6 18.0 14.0 11.1 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.50 58.7 41.9 30.6 22.7 17.3 13.5 10.7 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.45 56.7 40.3 29.3 21.8 16.5 12.8 10.2 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.40 54.1 38.3 27.7 20.5 15.5 12.0 9.6 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.35 50.9 35.8 25.7 18.9 14.3 11.0 8.8 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.30 46.5 32.3 23.0 16.8 12.6 9.7 7.7 6.3 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.25 40.4 27.5 19.2 13.8 10.2 7.8 6.2 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.20 31.3 20.4 13.5 9.3 6.6 5.0 3.9 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.15 16.1 8.4 4.1 1.8 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.10 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 71.1 51.1 37.5 28.0 21.3 16.6 13.1 10.6 8.6 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.95 70.6 50.7 37.2 27.8 21.2 16.4 13.0 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.90 70.1 50.3 36.8 27.5 20.9 16.3 12.9 10.4 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.85 69.5 49.8 36.5 27.2 20.7 16.1 12.7 10.2 8.4 7.0 5.8 5.0 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.80 68.8 49.3 36.0 26.9 20.5 15.9 12.6 10.1 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.75 68.0 48.7 35.6 26.5 20.2 15.6 12.4 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.70 67.2 48.0 35.0 26.1 19.8 15.4 12.2 9.8 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.65 66.2 47.2 34.4 25.6 19.4 15.1 11.9 9.6 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.60 65.0 46.3 33.7 25.0 19.0 14.7 11.6 9.4 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.55 63.6 45.2 32.8 24.3 18.4 14.3 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.50 61.9 43.9 31.8 23.5 17.8 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.45 59.9 42.3 30.5 22.5 17.0 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.40 57.4 40.3 28.9 21.3 16.0 12.3 9.7 7.9 6.5 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.35 54.1 37.7 26.9 19.7 14.7 11.3 8.9 7.2 6.0 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.30 49.8 34.3 24.2 17.5 13.0 10.0 7.9 6.4 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.25 43.7 29.5 20.4 14.5 10.7 8.1 6.4 5.2 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4
0.20 34.6 22.3 14.8 10.0 7.1 5.3 4.1 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.15 19.3 10.4 5.3 2.6 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0
0.10 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.4
0.05 0.0 -- 0.0 -- -- 0.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 -- 0.0 -- --
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Figure 49.  Officer Policy Chart: 9 YOS / O-3 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 50.  Officer Policy Chart: 9 YOS / O-3 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 69.5 50.4 37.3 28.1 21.5 16.8 13.4 10.8 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.95 69.1 50.1 37.0 27.8 21.3 16.7 13.2 10.7 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.90 68.6 49.7 36.7 27.6 21.2 16.5 13.1 10.6 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.85 68.0 49.3 36.3 27.3 20.9 16.3 13.0 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.80 67.4 48.8 35.9 27.0 20.7 16.1 12.8 10.4 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.75 66.7 48.2 35.5 26.7 20.4 15.9 12.6 10.2 8.4 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.70 65.9 47.5 35.0 26.3 20.1 15.7 12.4 10.0 8.2 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.65 64.9 46.8 34.4 25.8 19.7 15.4 12.2 9.9 8.1 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.60 63.8 45.9 33.7 25.2 19.3 15.0 11.9 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.55 62.5 44.9 32.9 24.6 18.8 14.6 11.6 9.4 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.50 60.9 43.7 31.9 23.8 18.2 14.1 11.2 9.1 7.5 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.45 59.0 42.2 30.7 22.9 17.4 13.6 10.8 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.40 56.6 40.3 29.3 21.7 16.5 12.8 10.2 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.35 53.6 37.9 27.4 20.2 15.3 11.9 9.4 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.30 49.5 34.6 24.8 18.2 13.7 10.6 8.4 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.25 43.7 30.1 21.2 15.4 11.5 8.8 7.0 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.20 35.1 23.4 15.9 11.2 8.1 6.2 4.9 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
0.15 20.8 12.1 7.0 4.1 2.5 1.7 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.10 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 -- -- -- 0.0 -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 72.8 52.4 38.5 28.8 22.0 17.1 13.5 10.9 8.9 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.95 72.3 52.1 38.2 28.6 21.8 17.0 13.4 10.8 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.90 71.8 51.7 37.9 28.4 21.6 16.8 13.3 10.7 8.7 7.2 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.85 71.3 51.2 37.6 28.1 21.4 16.6 13.2 10.6 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.80 70.6 50.7 37.2 27.8 21.2 16.4 13.0 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.75 69.9 50.2 36.7 27.4 20.9 16.2 12.8 10.3 8.4 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.70 69.1 49.5 36.2 27.0 20.6 16.0 12.6 10.2 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.65 68.1 48.8 35.6 26.5 20.2 15.7 12.4 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.8 4.2 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.60 67.0 47.9 34.9 26.0 19.8 15.3 12.1 9.8 8.0 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.55 65.7 46.9 34.1 25.4 19.3 14.9 11.8 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.50 64.2 45.7 33.2 24.6 18.6 14.4 11.4 9.2 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.45 62.3 44.2 32.0 23.7 17.9 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.40 59.9 42.3 30.5 22.5 17.0 13.1 10.4 8.4 6.9 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.35 56.8 39.9 28.6 21.0 15.8 12.2 9.6 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.30 52.7 36.6 26.0 19.0 14.2 10.9 8.6 6.9 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.25 47.0 32.1 22.5 16.1 11.9 9.1 7.2 5.8 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.20 38.4 25.3 17.1 11.9 8.6 6.4 5.1 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3
0.15 24.0 14.1 8.2 4.9 3.0 2.0 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
0.10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 51.  Officer Policy Chart: 10 YOS / O-4 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 52.  Officer Policy Chart: 10 YOS / O-4 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 71.2 51.7 38.3 28.9 22.2 17.3 13.8 11.1 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.95 70.7 51.4 38.0 28.7 22.0 17.2 13.6 11.0 9.0 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.90 70.3 51.0 37.7 28.4 21.8 17.0 13.5 10.9 8.9 7.4 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.85 69.7 50.6 37.4 28.2 21.6 16.9 13.4 10.8 8.9 7.3 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.80 69.1 50.1 37.0 27.9 21.4 16.7 13.2 10.7 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.75 68.4 49.6 36.6 27.5 21.1 16.5 13.1 10.6 8.6 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.70 67.6 49.0 36.1 27.1 20.8 16.2 12.9 10.4 8.5 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.65 66.7 48.2 35.5 26.7 20.4 15.9 12.7 10.2 8.4 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.60 65.7 47.4 34.9 26.2 20.0 15.6 12.4 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.55 64.4 46.4 34.1 25.6 19.5 15.2 12.1 9.8 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.50 62.9 45.2 33.2 24.8 18.9 14.8 11.7 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.45 61.1 43.8 32.0 23.9 18.2 14.2 11.3 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.40 58.8 42.0 30.6 22.8 17.3 13.5 10.7 8.7 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.35 55.8 39.7 28.8 21.3 16.2 12.6 10.0 8.1 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.30 51.9 36.6 26.3 19.4 14.7 11.4 9.0 7.3 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.25 46.4 32.2 22.9 16.7 12.5 9.6 7.6 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.20 38.1 25.7 17.8 12.6 9.3 7.1 5.6 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.15 24.4 14.9 9.2 5.9 3.9 2.8 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
0.10 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 -- -- -- 0.0 0.0 -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 74.4 53.7 39.5 29.6 22.6 17.6 13.9 11.2 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.95 74.0 53.4 39.3 29.4 22.5 17.5 13.8 11.1 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.90 73.5 53.0 39.0 29.2 22.3 17.3 13.7 11.0 9.0 7.5 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.85 73.0 52.6 38.6 28.9 22.1 17.2 13.6 10.9 8.9 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.0
0.80 72.4 52.1 38.2 28.6 21.8 17.0 13.4 10.8 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.75 71.7 51.6 37.8 28.3 21.6 16.8 13.3 10.7 8.7 7.2 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.70 70.9 50.9 37.3 27.9 21.3 16.5 13.1 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.65 70.0 50.2 36.8 27.4 20.9 16.2 12.8 10.3 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.60 68.9 49.4 36.1 26.9 20.5 15.9 12.6 10.1 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.55 67.7 48.4 35.3 26.3 20.0 15.5 12.3 9.9 8.1 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.50 66.2 47.2 34.4 25.6 19.4 15.1 11.9 9.6 7.9 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.45 64.3 45.8 33.3 24.7 18.7 14.5 11.5 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8
0.40 62.0 44.0 31.8 23.5 17.8 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.35 59.1 41.7 30.0 22.1 16.7 12.9 10.2 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.2 1.9 1.7
0.30 55.1 38.6 27.5 20.2 15.1 11.6 9.2 7.4 6.1 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.25 49.6 34.2 24.1 17.5 13.0 9.9 7.8 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.20 41.4 27.7 19.0 13.4 9.8 7.4 5.8 4.7 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4
0.15 27.6 16.9 10.4 6.6 4.4 3.1 2.4 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
0.10 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.0 -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 53.  Officer Policy Chart: 11 YOS / O-4 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 54.  Officer Policy Chart: 11 YOS / O-4 / female 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 73.2 53.3 39.5 29.8 22.9 17.9 14.2 11.5 9.4 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.95 72.8 53.0 39.3 29.6 22.8 17.8 14.1 11.4 9.3 7.7 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.90 72.3 52.6 39.0 29.4 22.6 17.7 14.0 11.3 9.3 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.85 71.8 52.2 38.7 29.2 22.4 17.5 13.9 11.2 9.2 7.6 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.80 71.2 51.8 38.3 28.9 22.2 17.3 13.8 11.1 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.75 70.6 51.3 37.9 28.6 21.9 17.1 13.6 11.0 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.70 69.9 50.7 37.5 28.2 21.6 16.9 13.4 10.8 8.9 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.0
0.65 69.0 50.0 36.9 27.8 21.3 16.6 13.2 10.7 8.7 7.2 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.60 68.0 49.3 36.3 27.3 20.9 16.3 13.0 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.55 66.9 48.3 35.6 26.7 20.5 16.0 12.7 10.2 8.4 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.50 65.5 47.2 34.7 26.1 19.9 15.5 12.3 10.0 8.2 6.8 5.7 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.45 63.8 45.9 33.7 25.2 19.3 15.0 11.9 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.40 61.6 44.2 32.4 24.2 18.4 14.4 11.4 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.35 58.9 42.1 30.7 22.8 17.4 13.5 10.7 8.7 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.30 55.2 39.2 28.4 21.0 15.9 12.4 9.8 8.0 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.25 50.1 35.1 25.2 18.5 13.9 10.8 8.6 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.20 42.4 29.1 20.4 14.7 11.0 8.4 6.7 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.15 29.6 19.0 12.5 8.4 6.0 4.4 3.5 2.9 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.10 4.0 -- -- 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- -- 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
0.05 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.0 -- 0.0 -- -- -- 0.0 -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 76.4 55.3 40.7 30.6 23.4 18.2 14.4 11.6 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.95 76.0 55.0 40.5 30.4 23.2 18.1 14.3 11.5 9.4 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.90 75.5 54.6 40.2 30.2 23.1 17.9 14.2 11.4 9.3 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.85 75.0 54.2 39.9 29.9 22.9 17.8 14.1 11.3 9.2 7.6 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.80 74.5 53.8 39.5 29.6 22.6 17.6 13.9 11.2 9.2 7.6 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.75 73.8 53.3 39.2 29.3 22.4 17.4 13.8 11.1 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.70 73.1 52.7 38.7 29.0 22.1 17.2 13.6 10.9 8.9 7.4 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.2 2.0
0.65 72.3 52.0 38.2 28.6 21.8 16.9 13.4 10.8 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.60 71.3 51.2 37.6 28.1 21.4 16.6 13.2 10.6 8.7 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.55 70.1 50.3 36.8 27.5 20.9 16.3 12.9 10.4 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.50 68.7 49.2 36.0 26.8 20.4 15.8 12.5 10.1 8.3 6.8 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.45 67.0 47.9 34.9 26.0 19.7 15.3 12.1 9.7 8.0 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.40 64.9 46.2 33.6 24.9 18.9 14.6 11.6 9.3 7.6 6.4 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.35 62.1 44.0 31.9 23.6 17.8 13.8 10.9 8.8 7.2 6.0 5.1 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.30 58.5 41.2 29.6 21.8 16.4 12.7 10.0 8.1 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.25 53.3 37.1 26.4 19.3 14.4 11.1 8.7 7.1 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6
0.20 45.7 31.1 21.6 15.5 11.4 8.7 6.8 5.6 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
0.15 32.9 21.0 13.7 9.2 6.4 4.7 3.7 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2
0.10 7.3 0.8 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 -- -- 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8
0.05 -- 0.0 -- -- 0.0 -- 0.0 0.0 -- 0.0 -- -- 0.0 0.0 -- -- 0.0 -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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Figure 55.  Officer Policy Chart: 12 YOS / O-4 / male 
 
 
 
Figure 56.  Officer Policy Chart: 12 YOS / O-4 / female 
 
 
BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 75.0 54.8 40.7 30.7 23.6 18.5 14.7 11.8 9.7 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1
0.95 74.6 54.4 40.4 30.6 23.5 18.4 14.6 11.8 9.6 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1
0.90 74.2 54.1 40.2 30.3 23.3 18.2 14.5 11.7 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.1
0.85 73.7 53.7 39.9 30.1 23.1 18.1 14.4 11.6 9.5 7.8 6.6 5.5 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1
0.80 73.2 53.3 39.5 29.9 22.9 17.9 14.2 11.5 9.4 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.75 72.6 52.8 39.2 29.6 22.7 17.7 14.1 11.4 9.3 7.7 6.4 5.5 4.6 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.70 71.9 52.3 38.7 29.2 22.4 17.5 13.9 11.2 9.2 7.6 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.65 71.1 51.7 38.2 28.8 22.1 17.3 13.7 11.1 9.1 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.60 70.1 50.9 37.6 28.4 21.8 17.0 13.5 10.9 8.9 7.4 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.55 69.0 50.1 37.0 27.8 21.3 16.6 13.2 10.7 8.7 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.50 67.7 49.0 36.1 27.2 20.8 16.2 12.9 10.4 8.5 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.45 66.1 47.7 35.1 26.4 20.2 15.7 12.5 10.1 8.3 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.40 64.1 46.1 33.9 25.4 19.4 15.1 12.0 9.7 8.0 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.35 61.5 44.1 32.3 24.1 18.4 14.3 11.4 9.2 7.5 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.30 58.0 41.4 30.1 22.4 17.0 13.2 10.5 8.5 7.0 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.25 53.1 37.5 27.1 20.0 15.1 11.7 9.3 7.5 6.2 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.20 45.8 31.8 22.5 16.4 12.3 9.5 7.5 6.1 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.15 33.7 22.2 15.0 10.4 7.5 5.7 4.5 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.10 9.4 3.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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BRS preferred High-3 preferred break-even CP multiplier
1.00 78.2 56.7 41.9 31.5 24.1 18.8 14.9 12.0 9.8 8.1 6.7 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1
0.95 77.9 56.4 41.7 31.3 24.0 18.7 14.8 11.9 9.7 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1
0.90 77.4 56.1 41.4 31.1 23.8 18.5 14.7 11.8 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.3 2.1
0.85 77.0 55.7 41.1 30.9 23.6 18.4 14.6 11.7 9.6 7.9 6.6 5.6 4.7 4.1 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.3 2.1
0.80 76.4 55.3 40.8 30.6 23.4 18.2 14.4 11.6 9.5 7.8 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.75 75.8 54.8 40.4 30.3 23.2 18.0 14.3 11.5 9.4 7.7 6.5 5.5 4.7 4.0 3.5 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.70 75.1 54.3 40.0 30.0 22.9 17.8 14.1 11.3 9.3 7.7 6.4 5.4 4.6 4.0 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.65 74.3 53.6 39.5 29.6 22.6 17.6 13.9 11.2 9.1 7.6 6.3 5.3 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.60 73.4 52.9 38.9 29.1 22.2 17.3 13.7 11.0 9.0 7.4 6.2 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.0
0.55 72.3 52.0 38.2 28.6 21.8 16.9 13.4 10.8 8.8 7.3 6.1 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.2 2.0
0.50 71.0 51.0 37.4 27.9 21.3 16.5 13.1 10.5 8.6 7.1 6.0 5.1 4.3 3.7 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.2 1.9
0.45 69.3 49.7 36.4 27.1 20.6 16.0 12.7 10.2 8.4 6.9 5.8 4.9 4.2 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.4 2.2 1.9
0.40 67.3 48.1 35.1 26.1 19.9 15.4 12.2 9.8 8.0 6.7 5.6 4.8 4.1 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9
0.35 64.7 46.1 33.5 24.8 18.8 14.6 11.5 9.3 7.6 6.3 5.4 4.6 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.8
0.30 61.2 43.3 31.3 23.1 17.5 13.5 10.7 8.6 7.1 5.9 5.0 4.3 3.7 3.2 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8
0.25 56.4 39.5 28.3 20.8 15.6 12.0 9.5 7.7 6.3 5.3 4.5 3.9 3.4 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7
0.20 49.1 33.8 23.8 17.2 12.8 9.8 7.7 6.2 5.2 4.4 3.8 3.3 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5
0.15 36.9 24.2 16.2 11.2 8.0 6.0 4.7 3.8 3.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3
0.10 12.6 5.1 1.1 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9
0.05 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
2% 3% 4% 5% 6% 7% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 15% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20%
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